Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion to dismiss the petition is denied, the petition is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Orange County, for further proceedings. As this Court recently stated in Matter of Shirley D. v. Carl D. ( 224 A.D.2d 60, 68): "[A]lthough Family Court Act § 154(b) contains language suggesting that the statute's reach should be limited to those persons otherwise subject to long-arm jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302, the provision, when read in its entirety and viewed in the context of its legislative history, permits the Family Court, in a [child support] proceeding, to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent where one of the minimum contacts delineated in the statute, which is designed to ensure due process, is shown to exist. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the subject provision concludes with a broad catch-all phrase permitting jurisdiction to be exercised where consistent with the United States and New York Constitutions."
Application of this provision, however, must comport with traditional notions of due process. Hence, "[s]ufficient minimum contacts with this State must be found in order to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) so that '"'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'" were not offended'" ( Birdsall v. Melita, 260 AD2d 809, 810, lv denied 93 NY2d 812, quoting Levy v. Levy, 185 AD2d 15, 18, appeal dismissed 82 NY2d 707, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 US 310, 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 US 457, 463; see generally Matter of Shirley D. v. Carl D., 224 AD2d 60).
Application of this provision, however, must comport with traditional notions of due process. Hence, "[s]ufficient minimum contacts with this State must be found in order to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) so that `"`traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'" were not offended'" (Birdsall v Melita, 260 AD2d 809, 810 [1999], lv denied 93 NY2d 812 [1999], quoting Levy v Levy, 185 AD2d 15, 18 [1993], appeal dismissed 82 NY2d 707 [1993], quoting International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 US 310, 316 [1945], quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 US 457, 463 [1940]; see generally Matter of Shirley D. v Carl D., 224 AD2d 60 [1996]). In the case of Lieb v Lieb (53 AD2d 67 [1976]), the Appellate Division, Second Department, interpreted that portion of CPLR 308 (b) which confers jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant when New York was the matrimonial domicile of the parties before their separation. The parties in Lieb had married in New York and resided here until 1957, at which time they moved to Virginia.
“As a general rule, in order for the courts of one State to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who is domiciled in another State, due process requires that there be sufficient minimum contacts between that individual and the forum State such that the forum State's assertion of jurisdiction will not offend ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” ’ ” ( Matter of Shirley D. v. Carl D., 224 A.D.2d 60, 63, 648 N.Y.S.2d 650, quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95). In particular, the subject individual's “conduct and connection with the forum State [must be] such that he [or she] should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there” ( World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490).
The appellant father, a Florida resident since 1987, contends that the Family Court in New York lacked personal jurisdiction over him and therefore it improperly entered an order of support in January 1995. However, Family Court Act § 154 (b) "permits the Family Court, in a [child support] proceeding, to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident respondent where one of the minimum contacts delineated in the statute, which is designed to ensure due process, is shown to exist" ( Matter of Shirley D. v Carl D., 224 A.D.2d 60, 68). Here, contrary to the father's contention, the minimum contact requirement under Family Court Act § 154 (b) was fulfilled in that he furnished support for the parties' child while the child resided within New York State ( see, Family Ct Act § 154 [b] [4]; Matterof Comfort v. Frolich, 239 A.D.2d 416; Matter of Shirley D. v. Carl D., supra).
The minimum contacts standard is designed to protect a defendant from having to litigate in a distant or inconvenient forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations (see, Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2181-2182, 85 L.Ed.2d 528), and to prevent the individual States from overreaching the judicial limits appropriate to "their status as coequal sovereigns" (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490)Shirley D. v. Carl D., 224 A.D.2d 60, 63-64, 648 N.Y.S.2d 650 [2d Dept 1996]. The defendants Jeffrey G. Ephraim and DiGiovanni & Ephraim, LLC have minimum contacts to the State of New York.
Application of this provision, however, must comport with traditional notions of due process. Hence, "[s]ufficient minimum contacts with this State must be found in order to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302 (a) so that " traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice'" were not offended'" (Senhart v. Senhart , 4 Misc 3d 862, affd. 18 AD3d 642, 795 N.Y.S.2d 642 (NY App. Div. 2d Dep't 2005), quoting Birdsall v Melita, 260 AD2d 809, 810, 688 N.Y.S.2d 283, lv denied 93 NY2d 812, 717 N.E.2d 700, 695 N.Y.S.2d 541, quoting Levy v Levy, 185 AD2d 15, 18, 592 N.Y.S.2d 480, appeal dismissed 82 NY2d 707, 619 N.E.2d 665, 601 N.Y.S.2d 587, quoting International Shoe Co. v Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L. Ed. 95, 66 S. Ct. 154, quoting Milliken v Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L. Ed. 278, 61 S. Ct. 339; see generally Matter of Shirley D. v Carl D., 224 AD2d 60, 648 N.Y.S.2d 650).
Application of this provision, however, must comport with traditional notions of due process. Hence, “[s]ufficient minimum contacts with this State must be found in order to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to CPLR 302(a) so that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' “ were not offended' “ (Senhart v. Senhart, 4 Misc.3d 862, affd. 18 AD3d 642, 795 N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y.App. Div.2d Dep't 2005), quoting Birdsall v. Melita, 260 A.D.2d 809, 810, 688 N.Y.S.2d 283 [1999], lv. denied 93 N.Y.2d 812, 717 N.E.2d 700, 695 N.Y.S.2d 541 [1999], quoting Levy v. Levy, 185 A.D.2d 15, 18, 592 N.Y.S.2d 480 [1993], appeal dismissed 82 N.Y.2d 707, 619 N.E.2d 665, 601 N.Y.S.2d 587 [1993], quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 90 L.Ed. 95, 66 S.Ct. 154 [1945], quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 85 L.Ed. 278, 61 S.Ct. 339 [1940]; see generally Matter of Shirley D. v. Carl D., 224 A.D.2d 60, 648 N.Y.S.2d 650 [1996] ).
Thus, "[t]he essential factual inquiry is whether the defendant has a permanent and continuous presence in the State, as opposed to merely occasional or casual contact with the State" ( see Holness v Maritime Overseas Corp., 251 AD2d 220, 222 [1st Dept 1998] [concerning corporation]), and engagement in occasional or casual business in New York does not suffice under CPLR 301, nor generally does mere solicitation of New York customers ( see Laufer v Ostrow, 55 NY2d 305; Miller v Surf Prop., 4 NY2d 475). While CPLR 301 has been used as the statutory predicate for jurisdiction concerning individuals ( see FCNB Spiegel Inc. v Dimmick, 163 Misc 2d 152 [Civ Ct, NY County 1994, Stallman, J.], citing ABKCO Indus. v Lennon, 52 AD2d 435 [1st Dept 1976] [Ringo Starr "doing business" in New York]; Lancaster v Colonial Motor Frgt. Line, Inc., 177 AD2d at 159]; but see Matter of Nilsa B.B. v Blackwell H, 84 AD2d 295 [2d Dept 1981] [child support case], superseded by statute Matter of Shirley D. v Carl D., 224 AD2d 60 [2d Dept 1996]), an individual cannot be subject to jurisdiction under CPLR 301 unless he or she is carrying on business for him or herself, rather than on behalf of a corporation ( see Laufer, 55 NY2d at 313; Brinkmann, 29 AD3d at 617).
SCPA § 1753 provides that process shall issue to the "parent or parents . . ., if their residences are known." In the construction of a statutory provision a specific provision should be analyzed in the context of the entire statute (Shirley D. v. Carl D., 224 A.D.2d 60). A companion provision, SCPA § 1705 (guardianship of infants) provides that process shall issue "to the parent or parents . . ., if such persons are within the state (emphasis supplied) and their residences therein are known. . . ."