Notably, 18 N.Y.CRR former 360.4 (a) (1), applicable at the time the State Commissioner made his determination, provides that an applicant shall be required as a condition to eligibility to "pursue any potential income or resources not currently available" (see also, present 18 NYCRR 360-2.3 [c]; 360-3.2). As this court has observed, the burden of proving eligibility for medical assistance is on the applicant (see, Matter of Hoelzer v. Blum, 93 A.D.2d 605, 609, supra; see also, Matter of Moffett v. Blum, 74 A.D.2d 625; Matter of Sherman v. Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d 675).
Hereinafter, we shall discuss the reasons separately in order to show why we are persuaded that they do not compel an invasion of the trust res. Initially, we note that the burden of proof for establishing eligibility for medical assistance is on the applicant ( Matter of Moffett v Blum, 74 A.D.2d 625; Matter of Sherman v Sanfilippo, 74 A.D.2d 675) and that the regulations for the medical assistance program require applicants and recipients to "utilize available resources and to apply for and otherwise pursue potentially available resources" ( 18 NYCRR 352.23 [a]; 18 NYCRR 360.4 [a]). Manifestly, the corpus of the testamentary trust is not a resource currently available to Norma Reichenbacher.