Matter of Shafran v. Bd. of Educ

12 Citing cases

  1. Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd.

    8 Cal.3d 150 (Cal. 1972)   Cited 91 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Hinojosa v. Workmen's Comp. AppealsBd. (1972) 8 Cal.3d 150 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 456, 501 P.2d 1176], this court stated that the going and coming rule makes noncompensable "the injury that occurs during a local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances.

    The decision in Smith accords with an impressive line of cases from other jurisdictions which have held that when the use of a private vehicle is an integral part of an employee's duties, an injury occurring while that vehicle is being transported to or from work occurs "in the course of employment." (See, e.g., State Department of Highways v. Johns (Alaska 1967) 422 P.2d 855, fn. 22 at p. 861; Pittsburgh Testing Laboratories v. Kiel (1960) 130 Ind. App. 598 [ 167 N.E.2d 604]; Davis v. Bjorenson (1940) 229 Iowa 7 [ 293 N.W. 829]; Willis v. Cloud (La. App. 1963) 151 So.2d 379, affd. mem., 244 La. 623 [ 153 So.2d 415]; Borak v. H.E. Westerman Lumber Co. (1953) 239 Minn. 327 [ 58 N.W.2d 567]; Begley v. International Terminal OperatingCo. (1971) 114 N.J. Super. 537 [ 277 A.2d 422]; Shafran v. Board of Education, Central Sch. Dist. (1966) 25 A.D.2d 336 [269 N.Y.S.2d 593]; King v. State Industrial AccidentCommission (1957) 211 Or. 40 [ 309 P.2d 159], affd. on reh. 211 Or. 71 [ 315 P.2d 148]; Bailey v. Utah State IndustrialCommission (1965) 16 Utah 2d 208 [ 398 P.2d 545]; 2 Hanna, Cal. Law of Employee Injuries and Workmen's Compensation (2d ed. 1970) § 9.03[3][c]ii; 1 Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, supra, § 17.50.) Although in the instant case the requirement for the car was implicit rather than express, the use of a vehicle can be "an implied or express condition of . . . employment."

  2. Matter of Barnard v. Lockport U. Sun Journal

    92 A.D.2d 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 4 times

    The board, relying on Matter of Taber v Abraham ( 3 A.D.2d 776) disallowed the claim on the ground that the accidental injury did not arise out of or in the course of claimant's employment due to the fact that he had not yet arrived at the fixed location to pick up his newspapers and, thus, his employment had not begun. This appeal ensued. The general rule is that employees are not deemed to be within the scope of their employment while traveling to and from work ( Matter of Greene v City of New York Dept. of Social Servs., 44 N.Y.2d 322, 325). While an exception to this rule has been recognized in the case of outside workers who have no fixed place of employment ( Matter of Bennett v. Marine Works, 273 N.Y. 429), such an exception is not applicable where the worker is required to report to a fixed location before commencing work ( Matter of Bennett v. Marine Works, supra; Matter of Shafran v. Board of Educ., 25 A.D.2d 336, mot for lv to app den 18 N.Y.2d 579). In any event, this court has held that newspaper delivery boys are not outside workers ( Matter of Taber v. Abraham, 3 A.D.2d 776, supra).

  3. Freebern v. North Rockland CDA

    64 A.D.2d 300 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)   Cited 7 times

    n would be a further erosion of the general rule that an employee does not enter into the course of his employment until he reaches the premises of his employer (Matter of Bennett v Marine Works, 273 N.Y. 429). There are, of course, several exceptions to the general rule, and for some occupations it may be that the general rule is now the exception; however, the majority of employees still cannot be considered in the course of their employment while traveling to and from the premises of the employer. Upon the present record, there is ample evidence that the claimant's automobile was the method of transportation adopted by the employer for the necessary travel between the two school buildings on the one day per week when the claimant worked one-half day in each school. If the incident had occurred while traveling from the North Garnerville School to the Garnerville School on the day on which a change in the employment premises was required, there would be some basis for coverage (see Matter of Shafran v Board of Educ., 25 A.D.2d 336, 337, mot for lv to app den 18 N.Y.2d 579; cf. Matter of Marciniak v Berlitz School, 43 A.D.2d 509, app dsmd 34 N.Y.2d 843) and, if the accident had occurred on a day when the automobile would be required for the change in schools, then there would be some basis for finding that the drive to work is in the course of the employment (Matter of Lutgen v Conte Elec., 50 A.D.2d 624). However, the accident herein did not occur on a day when the claimant was scheduled to spend one half of her work day in each school.

  4. Husted v. Seneca Steel Serv

    41 N.Y.2d 140 (N.Y. 1976)   Cited 78 times
    In Matter of Husted v Seneca Steel Serv. (41 N.Y.2d 140, 144, supra) we held that the mere fact that an accident occurs in an area open to the public does not necessarily negate the right to compensation.

    The dissenters took the position that the accident originated on a public highway, before claimant attached himself to his employment, and that it did not later become compensable merely because it was concluded on the employer's premises. The general rule that employees do not enter into the course of employment until they reach the premises or the entrance to the premises of their employer has been, of necessity, subject to certain well-recognized exceptions (Matter of Bennett v Marine Works, 273 N.Y. 429, 431; Matter of Shafran v Board of Educ., 25 A.D.2d 336, 337). The commonest ground of extension is said to involve those situations where the off-premises point at which the injury occurs lies on the only route, or at least the normal route, which employees must traverse to reach the plant and that, therefore, the special hazards of that route become the hazards of the employment (1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 15.13, p 4-7). Professor Larson states that this exception to the premises rule contains two components: the first being the presence of a special hazard at the particular off-premises point and the second, the close association of the access route with the premises, so far as going and coming are concerned (p 4-11).

  5. Matter of Shafran v. Bd. of Edc., Cen. Sc. Dist No. 1

    18 N.Y.2d 579 (N.Y. 1966)

    Decided September 22, 1966 Appeal from (3d dept.: 25 A.D.2d 336) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL.

  6. Matter of Pistor v. Pan American Airways

    165 A.D.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990)

    The injury to her back occurred while claimant was transporting certain work materials to her place of employment. Although she was not yet at work when the injury occurred, the transporting of the materials was not done as a matter of personal choice (cf., Matter of Broich v. New York State Union Coll. of Optometry, 117 A.D.2d 868). Claimant was required to have these materials with her while performing her job and there were no facilities at her place of employment to store the materials (see, Matter of Hoch v. Hansen, 111 A.D.2d 1066; Matter of Shafran v. Board of Educ., 25 A.D.2d 336, lv denied 18 N.Y.2d 579). Decision affirmed, without costs.

  7. Matter of Stone v. A.L.S. Construction Co.

    108 A.D.2d 1036 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    A more troubling question is whether claimant's injury arose out of or in the course of his employment. It is the general rule that accidents which occur while an employee is on his way to or from work do not arise out of or in the course of his employment ( Matter of Barnard v Lockport Union Sun Journal, 92 A.D.2d 663, 664, lv denied 60 N.Y.2d 552; Matter of Junium v Bazzini Co., 86 A.D.2d 690). There are exceptions to this rule, however, and the one most pertinent to this case is that which applies when an employee is required to bring to work his own vehicle for use during the workday ( Matter of Freebern v North Rockland CDA., 64 A.D.2d 300, 303; Matter of Shafran v Board of Educ., 25 A.D.2d 336, lv denied 18 N.Y.2d 579; 1 Larson, Worker's Compensation § 17.50 [1984]). As noted above, claimant was subject to such a requirement.

  8. Claim of Mang v. Actus Automobile Distributors, Inc.

    62 A.D.2d 1103 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)   Cited 1 times

    It is, therefore, found that accident arising out of and in the course of employment is established." Issues of fact are for the board and its decision is supported by substantial evidence and it is not erroneous as a matter of law (see Matter of Lutgen v Conte Elec., 50 A.D.2d 624; Matter of Shafran v Board of Educ., 25 A.D.2d 336, mot for lv to app den 18 N.Y.2d 579). Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen's Compensation Board. Greenblott, J.P., Main, Larkin, Mikoll and Herlihy, JJ., concur.

  9. Matter of Lutgen v. Conte Electrical, Inc.

    50 A.D.2d 624 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)   Cited 7 times

    On this appeal, the employer and the carrier challenge the board's determination that claimant's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment while claimant appeals the board's action in excusing the carrier's late filing of its notice of controversy. Although it is generally true that accidents which occur while an employee is on his way to work do not arise out of and in the course of employment (Matter of Mahar v Hills Baking Co., 22 A.D.2d 983), there are exceptions to this rule, such as where an employee is required to bring with him to work his own vehicle for use during his working day (Matter of Shafran v Board of Educ., Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 25 A.D.2d 336, mot for lv to app den 18 N.Y.2d 579; 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 17.50). Here, the employer admittedly requested that claimant come to work an hour earlier than usual and that he bring his truck with him for the purpose of removing scrap metal to a junkyard during the day. Under such circumstances, the board was clearly justified in finding that the accident arose out of and in the course of employment.

  10. Matter of Hampton v. Kelly

    33 A.D.2d 856 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969)   Cited 2 times

    This statement indicates no more than that decedent at the time of injury held the position of a clerk and by no rational construction that he was engaged in employment duties at that time. Similarly there is no basis on the instant record for classifying the decedent as an outside employee and the board did not so find. Rather it is clear that at the time of the accident the decedent was an inside employee on his way to work and thus the award is only sustainable here if by the nature of his employment duties decedent was required to have his motor vehicle available at the employment situs ( Matter of Shafran v. Board of Educ., Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 25 A.D.2d 336, mot. for lv. to app. den. 18 N.Y.2d 579). It is abundantly clear from the record that decedent used his car to drive to work for personal reasons and that he was not specifically instructed or required by his employer to bring his car to work.