Opinion
January 9, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Greenstein, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
It is well settled that an application for leave to serve a late notice of claim is addressed to the sound discretion of the Supreme Court upon consideration of the factors set forth in General Municipal Law § 50-e (5) (see, Matter of Perry v. City of New York, 133 A.D.2d 692). The petitioners in this case contend that their delay in serving the notice of claim resulted from their belated discovery that the injured petitioner's injuries were permanent. However, this proffered excuse is refuted by the petitioners' concession that they retained counsel (and commenced a lawsuit against various other individuals) prior to learning of the allegedly permanent nature of the injured petitioner's injuries. Moreover, the petitioners also contend that, for unknown reasons, their prior counsel simply failed to serve a notice of claim upon the City of New York or to seek leave to serve a late notice of claim. These proffered explanations fail to demonstrate a valid and acceptable excuse for the delay (see, e.g., Matter of D'Anjou v. New York City Health Hosps. Corp., 196 A.D.2d 818; Matter of Gandia v. New York City Hous. Auth., 173 A.D.2d 824; Matter of Mallory v. City of New York, 135 A.D.2d 636; Figueroa v. City of New York, 92 A.D.2d 908). Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, and in light of the entire record, we cannot say that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the petitioners' application. Sullivan, J.P., Thompson, Copertino and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.