Opinion
Submitted September 16, 1999
November 4, 1999
Monica Drinane, New York, N.Y. (Diane Pazar of counsel), for appellant.
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Elizabeth I. Freedman of counsel; Katherine N. Fernandez on the brief), for respondent.
FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., WILLIAM C. THOMPSON, THOMAS R. SULLIVAN, NANCY E. SMITH, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Ambrosio, J.), dated April 14, 1998, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court, dated February 25, 1998, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him on probation for 18 months. The appeal brings up for review the fact-finding order dated February 25, 1998.
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the presentment agency proffered independent evidence which corroborated the victim's unsworn testimony so as to furnish the necessary connection between the appellant and the crime-equivalent conduct (see,People v. Baculima, 228 A.D.2d 447 ; People v. Novak, 212 A.D.2d 740 ;People v. Johnson, 156 A.D.2d 383 ), including the testimony of the victim's mother regarding his complaints following the abuse (see generally, People v. McDaniel, 81 N.Y.2d 10, 16 ), the victim's prior consistent statements (see, Matter of Elizabeth D., 139 A.D.2d 66, 69 ; Matter of Tina H., 123 A.D.2d 864, 864-865 ), and the appellant's own version of the incident (see, People v. Morse, 177 A.D.2d 1015, 1016 ).
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the presenting agency, we find that it was legally sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of sexual abuse in the second degree (see, Matter of Jermaine B., 249 A.D.2d 468 ;Matter of Christopher S., 241 A.D.2d 498 ; cf., People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620 ). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the findings of fact were not against the weight of the evidence (see, Family Ct Act § 342 Fam. Ct. Act. 2[2]; Matter of Titus S., 243 A.D.2d 636 ).
SANTUCCI, J.P., THOMPSON, SULLIVAN, and SMITH, JJ., concur.