Summary
In Matter of Sabot v Lavine (42 N.Y.2d 1068) the Court of Appeals held that nominal amounts in children's savings accounts should be disregarded as available resources in determining eligibility for assistance in the category of aid to dependent children (cf. King v Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320-327).
Summary of this case from Edwards v. ToiaOpinion
Argued August 31, 1977
Decided October 13, 1977
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department.
Wendy Sabot, appellant pro se. Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (Peter A. Berkowsky, Samuel A. Hirshowitz and Herbert J. Wallenstein of counsel), for respondents.
MEMORANDUM. The judgment of the Appellate Division should be reversed.
In our view these sums deposited in the children's accounts are not available resources within the meaning of the statute or implementing regulation (10 N.Y.CRR 352.23) which must be exhausted before public assistance can be made available. The sums involved are not only trivial accumulations, the record shows that they are the result of small deposits — generally $5 or $10 — representing, indisputably, birthday and holiday gifts from relatives and casual employment by the children themselves. It is, of course, reasonable and obvious to expect a person, applicant, recipient, or beneficiary, to utilize his own resources before receiving public assistance. But the broad humanitarian purpose of the Social Services Law does not contemplate that a person must be stripped bare, emotionally and economically, of the small sums and personal paraphernalia of trivial value and of uncertain recurrence, before applying for public assistance. Somewhere the line must be drawn. Thus it would be absurd and cruel, and therefore unintended by statute or regulation, to consider grandfathers' watches, family pictures, family heirlooms of nominal value, toys, bicycles and small gifts to children as available "resources" which must be sold and consumed before public assistance will be made available. Any statute or regulation, but particularly social legislation, however broad, must be interpreted and enforced in a reasonable and humane manner in accordance with its manifest intent and purpose. Neither the applicable and controlling statute, nor the regulations adopted to implement the statute, in the absence of express language to the contrary, may be given an unreasonable and absurd interpretation (see, e.g., Matter of Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 56; Matter of Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 91; Williams v Williams, 23 N.Y.2d 592, 599).
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and COOKE concur.
Judgment reversed, with costs, and the petition granted in a memorandum.