But our review of disciplinary case law identified far more examples of cases in which a demonstrated mental disability or chemical dependence warranted a departure from the presumptive sanction, including in cases involving such egregious misconduct as the conversion of client funds.See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Zakroff, 876 A.2d 664, 690-91 (Md. 2005) (disbarring attorney who suffered from significant depression, a mood disorder, and a personality disorder and whose disorders were the "root cause" of his intentional dishonesty and misappropriation since he was not utterly incapable of conforming his conduct to the rules of professional conduct); Matter of Rowe, 174 A.D.2d 159, 160-61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (finding that mitigating factors, including mental disease, were not sufficient to overcome presumption of disbarment for lawyer who bludgeoned to death his wife and his three children); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Colston, 777 P.2d 920, 925-26 (Okla. 1989) (disbarring attorney who forged signatures on legal documents, deceived clients, and neglected client matters over five-year period, despite consideration of attorney's emotional and mental state of mind in mitigation, because of the "enormity and severity of the harmful misconduct"); Matter of Rich, 559 A.2d 1251, 1255-58 (Del. 1989) (disbarring attorney who engaged in extensive misconduct, including conversion of client funds, notwithstanding mitigating evidence that he suffered from passive-aggressive personality disorder and dysthymic disorder). Notably, none of the cases cited in this footnote explicitly interpret ABA Standard 9.3(i).

Inasmuch as it neither rendered advice to a particular person nor was intended to respond to known needs and circumstances of a larger group, its publication did not constitute the practice of law. The Appellate Division concluded that the publication violated subdivision (3) of its suspension order because the article "offered advice to readers on the significance and effect of court decisions concerning the legal rights of psychiatric patients who refuse treatment" ( 174 A.D.2d 159, 161). As so applied, the Court's order violated respondent's constitutional right to speak freely.

Decided June 4, 1992 Appeal from (2d Dept: 174 A.D.2d 159) APPEALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS