This certificate was evidently issued on the basis that this constituted a "Club house not conducted for gain" within the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance. When the Building Inspector discovered that the application falsely stated that the club owned this property, and the other circumstances came to light indicating that it was operated for gain according to the facts alleged in the petition, the Building Inspector — after objection by the neighbors who also had recently learned the facts rendering the use illegal — revoked this certificate of occupancy by reason of the false statement of ownership contained in the petition, which he had power to do ( People ex rel. Finnegan v. McBride, 226 N.Y. 252; Matter of Rosenbush v. Keller, 247 App. Div. 748, affd. 271 N.Y. 282; Rollins v. Armstrong, 226 App. Div. 687, 752, affd. 251 N.Y. 349; Southern Leasing Co. v. Ludwig, 217 N.Y. 100; Town of Greenburgh v. Buser, 285 App. Div. 1090). These cases hold not merely that the Building Inspector was empowered to revoke the certificate of occupancy but that it was his duty and that he could be compelled to revoke it if the use did not conform to the zoning ordinance.

common-law rights ( People ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 App. Div. 87; affd., 250 N.Y. 598; Matter of Multiplex Garages, Inc., v. Walsh, 241 N.Y. 527; Wood v. Tunnicliff, 74 N.Y. 38, 43; Woollcott v. Schubert, 217 N.Y. 212, 220). The provisions of the resolution may not be extended by implication ( Matter of Monument Garage Corp. v. Levy, 266 N.Y. 339). It was a strict legal right of appellant to continue the non-conforming uses existing at the effective date of the amendment to the Amended Building Zone Resolution in 1934 since the property was at that time wholly within an unrestricted district for which no regulations or restrictions were provided (Amended Building Zone Resolution, § 5; Village of Mill Neck v. Nolan, 259 N.Y. 596). Appellant, however, acquired no "vested rights" by virtue of the permits and certificate of occupancy upon which it may here rely since applications for the permits and certificate were made and granted later than the effective date of the amendment ( Matter of Rosenbush v. Keller, 247 App. Div. 748; affd., 271 N.Y. 282. ) Section 1 of the Amended Building Zone Resolution provides that the word "building" shall include the word "structure."

Order and order and judgment (one paper) affirmed, without costs or disbursements. The grant of a building permit, followed by completion of the work, does not constitute, per se, an estoppel against denial of a certificate of occupancy (see Marcus v Village of Mamaroneck, 283 N.Y. 325, 330; Matter of Rosenbush v Keller, 247 App. Div. 748). However, here there are the added facts that (1) prior to the building inspector's issuance of the building permit, the village attorney and other officials were present at an administrative hearing where the precise issue of whether the altered use as a clubhouse fell within the interdiction of a "place of public assembly" was discussed, and offered no opposition to the applicant's claim that it did not, and (2) the interpretation of the building inspector was a rational one and not clearly incorrect. Under these circumstances, the subsequent building inspector could not properly refuse to issue a certificate of occupancy based on an interpretation of "place of public assembly" that was contrary to that of the prior building inspector who issued the building permit.

Despite its inability to establish an equitable estoppel in this forum, the defendant should not be precluded from seeking relief from the town which is not a party to this action and whose zoning board of appeals may choose to exercise its discretion to grant relief from the consequences of the building inspector's errors. Good faith reliance upon an invalid permit can be considered by a board of appeals on an application for a variance (Matter of Cortodd Homes v Misiakiewicz, 45 A.D.2d 1008, supra; Matter of Jayne Estates v Raynor, 22 N.Y.2d 417, supra; Matter of Badish v O'Regan, 212 N.Y.S.2d 632; cf. Matter of Midgett v Schermerhorn, 24 A.D.2d 572) where the expenditures are a factor in the determination of unnecessary hardship (Matter of Ullian v Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 68 Misc.2d 393, affd 38 A.D.2d 850). On such an application, the entire issue of notice (see Matter of Rosenbush v Keller, 247 App. Div. 748, affd. 271 N.Y. 282) may undergo a scrutiny it has not received here because the result was otherwise arrived at. The other defenses raised by the defendant are without merit.

The permit issued by him on September 29, 1953 was illegal and void, as being in violation of the zoning resolution and he properly revoked it. It was his duty to do so and he could be compelled to do so as the use did not conform to the zoning resolution (cf. Matter of Arents v. Squires, 7 N.Y.2d 1009, 1015). "The issuance of a permit could not nullify those statutory provisions [referring to zoning statutes] and vested rights could not be acquired by the petitioner in reliance on an illegal permit" ( Rosenbush v. Keller, 247 App. Div. 748). Of course, during the period November 21, 1957 to December 19, 1957, when the area was zoned to permit one or two-family occupancy, petitioner might have made application for such certificate and same might have been legally issued. But, without such certificate, occupancy by more than one family was illegal.