Opinion
October 28, 1970
Appeal by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in Cortland County, which annulled a determination revoking petitioner's operator's license because of his conviction of leaving the scene of an accident without reporting (Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 600). Petitioner pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident without reporting and subsequently the Commissioner automatically revoked petitioner's operator's license pursuant to the mandate of section 510 (subd. 2, par. [c]) of the former Vehicle and Traffic Law (now Vehicle and Traffic Law, § 510 [subd. 2, par. a, cl. iii]). Petitioner was twice fully informed as required by section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure before he entered his plea. Special Term concluded, however, that because the Justice of the Peace before whom petitioner made his plea of guilty advised him that a plea of guilty would not result in an automatic revocation of his operator's license, the previously given statutory warnings were vitiated and annulled the Commissioner's revocation of petitioner's license. The record does not support these facts or this conclusion. Petitioner does not allege that the Magistrate informed him his operator's license would not be revoked, merely that the Magistrate did not inform him specifically that his license would be revoked. And under section 335-a as amended in 1953 (L. 1953, ch. 288) all that is required is the uniform warning and not that the specific applicable penalty consequent to a plea of guilty be spelled out ( Matter of Hubbell v. Macduff, 2 N.Y.2d 563; Matter of Eckerson v. Macduff, 284 App. Div. 56). Petitioner does allege that Trooper Beyea, in front of the Magistrate informed him "that he could have a Motor Vehicle hearing". There is no allegation, however, that the Magistrate heard such conversation or acquiesced in it, and the officer's statement alone, which does not assure petitioner that he would be granted a lighter penalty (cf. People v. Sykes, 23 A.D.2d 701) did not vitiate the previous warnings given in compliance with section 335-a. Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend what "extenuating circumstances" could possibly have excused petitioner's failure to inform the police of the accident until the next morning. Matter of Zoll v. Hults ( 20 A.D.2d 496) is factually inapposite. Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed. Judgment reversed, on the law and the facts, and petition dismissed, without costs. Herlihy, P.J., Reynolds, Staley, Jr., Greenblott and Sweeney, JJ., concur.