Matter of Rogers v. Gen. Aniline Film Corp.

3 Citing cases

  1. Johannesen v. New York City Department of Housing Preservation & Development

    84 N.Y.2d 129 (N.Y. 1994)   Cited 52 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that plaintiff's asthma, caused by exposure to second-hand smoke, is covered by Workers' Compensation, explaining that "accidental injury" is a "term of art," and that "[t]he seriously adverse environmental conditions to which claimant was subjected as part of her job and workplace reasonably qualify as an unusual hazard"

    her workplace and the now quintessential cardiac collapse cases ensuing from extended periods of strain for which awards are customarily upheld (see, e.g., Matter ofSchechter v State Ins. Fund, 6 N.Y.2d 506; Matter of Masse v Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, supra). Claimant's predisposition with an asthma condition does not change the analysis or result. It is well settled that where causally related injuries from a claimant's employment precipitate, aggravate or accelerate a preexisting infirmity or disease, the resulting disability is compensable (see, e.g., Matter of McCormick v Green Bus Lines, 29 N.Y.2d 246; Matter of Masse v Robinson Co., 301 N.Y. 34, 37, supra ["(a) heart injury such as coronary occlusion or thrombosis when brought on by overexertion or strain in the course of daily work is compensable, though a pre-existing pathology may have been a contributing factor"]; Matter of Lynch v Rockland County Dept. of Social Servs., 124 A.D.2d 430 [aggravation of arthritic condition]; Matter of Rogers v General Aniline Film Corp., 33 A.D.2d 1074; Matter of Nofi v American Chicle Co., 9 A.D.2d 966, lv denied 7 N.Y.2d 710 [aggravation of spondylolisthesis]). Appellant employer urges additional cases (for example, Barrencotto v Cocker Saw Co., 266 N.Y. 139; Matter of Lanphier v Air Preheater Corp., 278 N.Y. 403; Matter of Vaughn v Bushwick Iron Steel, 9 N.Y.2d 727) to support its view that claimant's bronchial asthma was not an accidental injury. These cases require no extended discussion or analysis because they are plainly distinguishable on their facts and on distinctive legal principles involved.

  2. Middleton v. Coxsackie Fac

    38 N.Y.2d 130 (N.Y. 1975)   Cited 49 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Matter of Middleton v. Coxsackie Correctional Facility (38 N.Y.2d 130), upon which the Board relied, the Court of Appeals concluded that "the concept of time-definiteness required of an accident can be thought of as applying to either the cause or the result, so that there can be a compensable accident where there is an exposure to a condition over a protracted period during which the victim succumbs to a disease culminating in a relatively sudden collapse" (id., at 135).

    etermining whether an event is accidental widens very considerably the ambit of the triers of the facts, affording greater latitude for consideration of an unforeseen and catastrophic result, rather than narrow emphasis on cause (Matter of Gioia v Courtmel Co., 283 App. Div. 40, 43, mot for lv to app den 306 N.Y. 985; 65 N.Y. Jur, Workmen's Compensation, §§ 262, 272). Aside from the common-sense viewpoint of the average man criterion, recognition has also been given to the principle that the concept of time-definiteness required of an accident can be thought of as applying to either the cause or the result, so that there can be a compensable accident where there is an exposure to a condition over a protracted period during which the victim succumbs to a disease culminating in a relatively sudden collapse (Matter of Pessel v Macy Co., 40 A.D.2d 746, affd 33 N.Y.2d 721; Matter of Tivey v Van Son Holland Ink Corp. of Amer., 40 A.D.2d 746; Matter of Suber v Hope's Windows, 38 A.D.2d 656; Matter of Rogers v General Aniline Film Corp., 33 A.D.2d 1074; Matter of Jones v Curran Co., 33 A.D.2d 525; Matter of Ellis v Armour Co., 31 A.D.2d 690; Matter of Greensmith v Franklin Nat. Bank, 21 A.D.2d 576, 578, affd 16 N.Y.2d 973; Matter of Reichard v Franklin Mfg. Co., 223 App. Div. 797, affd 249 N.Y. 525; 1A Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 39.10, p 7-203); and it is not decisive that a claimant is unable to pinpoint the exact date on which the incident occurred (Matter of Levine v Imperial Textile Co., 40 A.D.2d 886; Matter of Stein v Schneider, 34 A.D.2d 1062). The board found that this claimant sustained the accidental injury of "repeated trauma" due to persistent coughing by a tubercular inmate in claimant's presence from August to November, 1969 and thereafter began to cough and on December 18, 1970 became disabled from tuberculosis.

  3. Matter of Levine v. Imperial Textile Company

    40 A.D.2d 886 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972)   Cited 1 times

    Appeal from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board, filed November 11, 1971, which held that claimant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment on November 14, 1969, the date a physician examined him and recommended a spinal fusion. Although, in order to find an accident, there must be an element of suddenness in either the cause of disability or the result thereof ( Matter of Suber v. Hope's Windows, 38 A.D.2d 656), the failure of the board to pinpoint the precise day on which the "suddenness" of result occurred is not fatal to an award based on the present record ( Matter of Rogers v. General Aniline Film Corp., 33 A.D.2d 1074). Decision affirmed, with costs to the Workmen's Compensation Board. Staley, Jr., J.P., Greenblott, Cooke, Kane and Reynolds, JJ., concur.