Matter of Ricisak

5 Citing cases

  1. Shurrum v. Watts

    80 Idaho 44 (Idaho 1958)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the intention of the parties determines whether a resulting trust arises

    " See also United States v. Third Nat. Bank Trust Co., D.C.Pa., 111 F. Supp. 152; Glessner v. Security-Peoples Trust Co., 156 Pa. Super. 56, 39 A.2d 165; Bianchi v. Bedell, 2 N.J.Super. 236, 63 A.2d 273; Malone v. Walsh, 315 Mass. 484, 53 N.E.2d 126; Kittredge v. Manning, 317 Mass. 689, 59 N.E.2d 261; Ball v. Mercantile Trust Co., 220 Mo.App. 1165, 297 S.W. 415; Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, 30 N.W.2d 834; Kelberger v. First Federal Savings Loan Ass'n, 270 Wis. 434, 71 N.W.2d 257; Murray v. Gadsden, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 197 F.2d 194, 33 A.L.R.2d 554; In re Ricisak's Estate, 2 Misc.2d 717, 150 N.Y.S.2d 380; Bassi v. Bassi, 89 Cal.App.2d 886, 202 P.2d 96; Paterson v. Comastri, 39 Cal.2d 66, 244 P.2d 902; Annotation, 33 A.L.R.2d 569. "The intention of the owner of money in depositing it in a joint account is a question of fact where there is evidence as to the intention.

  2. Matter of Sloane

    226 A.D.2d 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)

    Appeal from the Surrogate's Court, Nassau County (C. Raymond Radigan, S.). The preliminary executor, son of the deceased parties, sufficiently met his burden of coming forward with evidence demonstrating that his father was mentally competent to understand the choice he was making in establishing a joint account with him, and the record contains no evidence of coercion or undue influence ( see, Matter of Camarda, 63 A.D.2d 837; Matter of Ricisak, 2 Misc.2d 717; Matter of Donleavy, 41 Misc.2d 28, 30-31). There was also clear and convincing evidence of an inter vivos gift by the preliminary executor's mother of her moiety interest in the joint Chemical Bank account ( see, Matter of Giacalone, 143 A.D.2d 749; Matter of McCarthy, 164 Misc. 719, 722-723, affd 254 App. Div. 827), as delivery of the checks representing the balance of the funds in the account was made at her request and in her presence.

  3. Matter of Camarda

    63 A.D.2d 837 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978)   Cited 63 times

    It is therefore clear from the rest of the testimony that this account also was created as a matter of convenience. In transactions of this type, where one of the parties is elderly, illiterate, or otherwise incapacitated and there is a fiduciary relationship such as mother and daughter, the burden of proof is on the person handling the financial affairs to show that the incapacitated party understood the nature of the transactions and that her will was not overborne by the stronger party (Allen v La Vaud, 213 N.Y. 322; Matter of McMurdo, 56 A.D.2d 602; Matter of Gordon, 17 A.D.2d 165; Matter of Dziadzio, 31 Misc.2d 125; Matter of Ricisak, 2 Misc.2d 717). Given the fiduciary or confidential relationship which existed between decedent and the executrix, the fact that decedent was elderly and could neither read nor write, and that decedent entrusted her financial affairs to her daughter, the burden clearly shifted to the executrix to show that her mother knowingly and willfully intended to make a gift to her of the assets in the bank accounts. She did not sustain her burden (see Matter of McMurdo, 56 A.D.2d 602, supra; Matter of Levy, 19 A.D.2d 413) and should be surcharged in the amount of those accounts.

  4. Matter of Murphy

    23 A.D.2d 866 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965)   Cited 8 times

    The burden of proof is, therefore, on her to establish by clear and convincing evidence her title to such proceeds ( Matter of Rabinowitz, 5 Misc.2d 803; 3 Warren's Heaton, Surrogates' Courts [6th ed.], § 236, par. 4, p. 181). Even as to joint bank accounts, the party who asserts that another has given him a joint interest in the fund has the burden of establishing to the satisfaction of the trier of the facts all the essential elements of a gift ( Matter of Ricisak, 2 Misc.2d 717; Matter of McCarthy, 164 Misc. 719; 2 Bradford Butler, New York Surrogate Law and Practice, § 1467, p. 348). Had the joint account which the decedent in 1961 established with his said daughter, payable to either or survivor, remained intact to the date of his death, the daughter would have been aided in sustaining her burden of proof by the conclusive presumption that title to the proceeds passed to her as survivor ( Matter of Bricker [ Krimer] v. Krimer, 13 N.Y.2d 22).

  5. Matter of Dziadzo

    31 Misc. 2d 125 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1961)   Cited 3 times

    It thus became competent for the petitioner to show that the apparent joint tenancy was not a joint tenancy at all. ( Matter of Ricisak, 2 Misc.2d 717.) These parties were not dealing with each other on an equal basis.