Decided February 23, 1993 Appeal from (4th Dept: 187 A.D.2d 1039) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED
A per se dismissal rule would be inconsistent with the objective of the dispositional hearing ( see, Matter of Jose R., 83 NY2d 388, 394-395; Matter of John McC, 223 AD2d 709, lv denied 88 NY2d 804; Matter of Eddie M., 196 AD2d 25, 29-31, lv denied 83 NY2d 757). Respondent was not detained pending the dispositional hearing, and the Law Guardian never expressly declined to waive the statutory time limits, but instead consented to one adjournment and agreed that each of the other adjourned dates was acceptable ( cf., Matter of Richard G., 187 AD2d 1039, lv denied 81 NY2d 705). (Appeal from Order of Onondaga County Family Court, Hedges, J. — Person In Need of Supervision.)
In my view, that reason did not justify the additional nine-day adjournment. Difficulties in placing an appellant are not so unusual or compelling so as to warrant an additional adjournment under the "special circumstances" provision (see, Matter of Richard G., 187 A.D.2d 1039), and no further explanation for the delay was provided (cf., Matter of Kasheen A., supra). Nor does the awaiting of any probation report necessarily constitute special circumstances (see, Matter of Leon H., 196 A.D.2d 539; Matter of Erik N., 185 A.D.2d 433). Even assuming that the delay in finding a suitable placement was due in part to the Probation Department's workload, this would not justify an adjournment beyond the statutory time limit.
Respondent contends for the first time on appeal that the timing of the dispositional hearing violated the speedy disposition provisions of the Family Court Act. The Law Guardian did not move to dismiss the petition on the ground that respondent had been denied his right to a timely hearing and, therefore, that right was waived (see, Matter of Richard G., 187 A.D.2d 1039).