Opinion
January 26, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Gurahian, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements, and matter remitted to Supreme Court, Westchester County, for further proceedings in accordance herewith.
The hearing court premised its decision to limit visits by the grandparents to Westchester County on a mistaken belief that, as a matter of law, it lacked the authority to permit visitation outside this State. Once the Supreme Court or Family Court has properly acquired jurisdiction over the parties based on sufficient contacts with this State (Domestic Relations Law § 72; Becker v. Watanabe, 109 A.D.2d 861), it is empowered to make any appropriate order with regard to custody or visitation (Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, 40 N.Y.2d 522). This power is not restricted by State boundaries, and the courts' exercise of this power has so long been firmly settled that citation of authority is rarely considered necessary (cf. People ex rel. Satti v. Satti, 55 A.D.2d 149, 152, affd 43 N.Y.2d 671; Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 432-433; see, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Domestic Relations Law § 75-a et seq.; Chirumbolo v. Chirumbolo, 75 A.D.2d 992).
The terms of a visitation order under this section are in the sound discretion of the hearing court (see, Lo Presti v. Lo Presti, supra). However, the court apparently acted in the belief that it lacked the discretion to permit visits outside this State (including meetings at the homes of relatives in New Jersey and Connecticut that are closer to the child's home than the grandparents' Vermont residence). Accordingly, the matter is remitted to the hearing court for such an exercise of its discretion as it deems appropriate in light of this court's ruling. Mollen, P.J., Thompson, Weinstein and Rubin, JJ., concur.