Matter of Piela v. Van Voris

24 Citing cases

  1. Coal. to Protect N.Y. v. Vill. of Painted Post (In re Sierra Club)

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 52342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)

    See affidavits of Sierra Club member Kate Bartholomew, People for Healthy Environment, Inc. president Ruth Young. On the requirement of proof, as opposed to mere pleading, on the standing issue, see Matter of Noslen Corporation v. Ontario County Bd. Of Supervisors, 295 AD2d 924, 925 (4th Dept. 2002); Matter of Piela v. Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94, 95 (3d Dept 1997)("the distinction is particularly germane in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding"). Further, as respondents point out, none of the individual petitioners assert that they are members of the organization respondents.

  2. Sierra Club v. Vill. of Painted Post

    28 N.Y.S.3d 650 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)

    See affidavits of Sierra Club member Kate Bartholomew, People for Healthy Environment, Inc. president Ruth Young. On the requirement of proof, as opposed to mere pleading, on the standing issue, see Matter of Noslen Corporation v. Ontario County Bd. Of Supervisors, 295 A.D.2d 924, 925, 744 N.Y.S.2d 737 (4th Dept.2002); Matter of Piela v. Van Voris, 229 A.D.2d 94, 95, 655 N.Y.S.2d 105 (3d Dept 1997)("the distinction is particularly germane in a CPLR Article 78 proceeding").Further, as respondents point out, none of the individual petitioners assert that they are members of the organization respondents.

  3. Wilson v. Town of Tuxedo, the Town Bd. of the Town of Tuxedo, the Planning Bd. of the Town of Tuxedo, David Maikisch Inspector of the Town of Tuxedo, & Tuxedo Reserve Owner, LLC (In re Application of Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc.)

    950 N.Y.S.2d 611 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    Landowners seeking said benefit have “the burden of coming forward with competent evidence to support a finding that their property is located in the immediate vicinity of the [the site].” Matter of Piela v. Van Voris, 229 A.D.2d 94, 95 (3rd Dep't 1997).

  4. Wilson v. Town of Tuxedo (In re Tuxedo Land Trust, Inc.)

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 50377 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    Landowners seeking said benefit have "the burden of coming forward with competent evidence to support a finding that their property is located in the immediate vicinity of the [the site]." Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94, 95 (3rd Dep't 1997). Moreover, because the action which allegedly caused them harm was the Town Bd's deficient environmental review in its determination of TRO's August 2008 application for amendments to the Special Permit, petitioners in the instant proceeding must demonstrate that their injuries were the result of that determination (hereafter, the "Action"), not some other or prior alleged nonfeasance or misfeasance.

  5. Airport Parking Assocs., LLC v. Town of N. Castle, NY

    200 A.D.3d 684 (N.Y. App. Div. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    Generally, the relevant distance is the distance between the petitioner's property and the actual structure or development itself, not the distance between the petitioner's property and the property line of the site (see Matter ofTuxedo Land Trust, Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Tuxedo, 112 A.D.3d at 728, 977 N.Y.S.2d 272 ; Matter ofGallahan v. Planning Bd. of City of Ithaca, 307 A.D.2d 684, 762 N.Y.S.2d 850 ; see also Matter ofBarrett v. Dutchess County Legislature, 38 A.D.3d 651, 654, 831 N.Y.S.2d 540 ; Matter ofZiemba v. City of Troy, 37 A.D.3d 68, 71, 827 N.Y.S.2d 322 ). Here, the Supreme Court correctly found that the petitioner failed to satisfy its burden of coming forward with probative evidence sufficient to establish that its property is located in sufficiently close proximity to the challenged project in order to be entitled to the presumption that it would suffer injury in fact (see Matter ofPiela v. Van Voris, 229 A.D.2d 94, 95–96, 655 N.Y.S.2d 105 ). Furthermore, where the only substantiated injury is the threat of increased business competition, an interest which is not within the zone of interests protected by the zoning laws, even a close neighbor lacks standing to contest a zoning determination (seeMatter of Sun–Brite Car Wash, Inc. v. Board of Zoning & Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 N.Y.2d at 410, 515 N.Y.S.2d 418, 508 N.E.2d 130 ).

  6. Airport Parking Assocs. v. Town of N. Castle, NY

    No. 2018-03451 (N.Y. App. Div. Dec. 1, 2021)

    Here, the Supreme Court correctly found that the petitioner failed to satisfy its burden of coming forward with probative evidence sufficient to establish that its property is located in sufficiently close proximity to the challenged project in order to be entitled to the presumption that it would suffer injury in fact (see Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 A.D.2d 94, 95-96).

  7. East End Property Co. v. Planning Bd.

    56 A.D.3d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with one bill of costs. The Supreme Court properly concluded that the petitioners lacked standing to commence this proceeding ( see Society of Plastics Indus, v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 774; Matter of Long Is. Contractors' Assn. v Town of Riverhead, 17 AD3d 590, 595; Matter of Rediker v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Philipstown, 280 AD2d 548; Matter of Many v Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218 AD2d 845; Matter of Casement v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 162 AD2d 685; see also Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94). The petitioners' remaining contentions need not be reached in light of our determination.

  8. East End Property Co. v. Town Board

    56 A.D.3d 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 6 times

    The Supreme Court properly determined that the petitioners lacked standing to assert their claims challenging the Town Board's approval of the special permit, waiver, and area variances. The petitioners may not avail themselves of the presumption of injury in fact since they have not demonstrated that their properties lie in close proximity to the project ( see Matterof Long Is. Contractors' Assn. v Town of Riverhead, 17 AD3d 590, 595; Matter of Rediker v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Philipstown, 280 AD2d 548; Matter of Many v Village of Sharon Springs Bd. of Trustees, 218 AD2d 845; Matter of Casement v Town of Poughkeepsie Planning Bd., 162 AD2d 685; see also Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94), and they have otherwise failed to demonstrate that they will suffer any injury which is "in some way different from that of the public at large" ( Society of Plastics Indus, v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 774; see Matter of Long Is. Contractors' Assn. v Town of Riverhead, 17 AD3d 590). The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination

  9. Rossi v. Town

    49 A.D.3d 1138 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 16 times
    In Matter of Rossi v. Town Bd. of Town of Ballston (49 AD3d 1138, 1142 [3d Dept 2008]), the Appellate Division, Third Department held that petitioner property owners lacked standing to contest the Town Board's denial of Wal–Mart's PUDD application related to their parcels.

    Where a party owns property that falls within an area affected by the regulation in question, it is presumed to have been adversely affected by the change in the zoning law and have standing to contest it ( see Matter of SunBrite Car Wash v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of N. Hempstead, 69 NY2d 406, 414; Matter of Schulz v Lake George Park Commn., 180 AD2d 852, 855). As petitioners are owners of property that is located within one of the zoning districts to which the new zoning law applies and, as a result, the zoning scheme for their property has been changed, they "would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large" ( Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk, 77 NY2d 761, 774; see Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94, 95). Moreover, petitioners have standing to challenge the SEQRA process as they have a specific noneconomic environmental injury that falls within the zone of interest sought to be protected by that statute ( see Matter of Gernatt Asphalt Prods. v Town of Sardinia, 87 NY2d 668, 687; Matter of Mobil Oil Corp. v Syracuse Indus. Dev. Agency, 76 NY2d 428, 433).

  10. Bolton v. S. Bristol Plann. Board

    38 A.D.3d 1307 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 3 times

    We conclude that Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner lacks standing to bring this proceeding. Petitioner lives one mile from the residential development, on the opposite side of the lake, and he did not demonstrate that he "will suffer an environmental impact in fact [as a result of the proposed expansion], i.e., one that is in some way different from that of the public at large" ( Matter of Piela v Van Voris, 229 AD2d 94, 95; see Matter of Buerger v Town of Grafton, 235 AD2d 984, 984-985, lv denied 89 NY2d 816; Matter of Schulz v Warren County Bd. of Supervisors, 206 AD2d 672, 674, lv denied 85 NY2d 805; see generally Matter of Gerdts v State of New York, 210 AD2d 645, 646-647, appeal dismissed 85 NY2d 856, lv denied 85 NY2d 810; Matter of Otsego 2000 v Planning Bd. of Town of Otsego, 171 AD2d 258, 259-260, lv denied 79 NY2d 753). Petitioner's assertions of potential injury are speculative and conclusory and thus are lacking in probative value ( see Matter of Noslen Corp. v Ontario County Bd. of Supervisors, 295 AD2d 924, 925; see also Buerger, 235 AD2d at 985). In any event, were we to address the merits of the petition, we would conclude that respondent properly identified the relevant potential environmental impacts of the proposed expansion, took the requisite hard look at those impacts, and made a reasoned elaboration of the basis for its negative declaration ( see generally Matter of Kahn v Pasnik,