Matter of Phillips

3 Citing cases

  1. Lawrence v. Miller

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 9434 (N.Y. 2008)   Cited 419 times
    Affirming denial of motion to dismiss in a legal malpractice case because the parties had not presented evidence to show whether the retainer agreement was unconscionable

    Appellants' unproven allegations of professional misconduct afford no basis for dismissal of the petition. ( Matter of Lanyi, 147 AD2d 644; Landsman v Moss, 180 AD2d 718; Wade v Clemmons, 84 Misc 2d 822; King v Fox, 7 NY3d 181; Matter of Fitzsimons, 174 NY 15; Gross v Russo, 47 AD2d 655; Matter of Phillips, 284 AD2d 897; Matter of Lippman, 232 AD2d 69; Rodin v Opperman, 64 AD2d 820; Matter of Buchyn, 300 AD2d 739.) IV Graubard Miller's claim for legal fees under SCPA 2110 should not be dismissed.

  2. King v. Fox

    2006 N.Y. Slip Op. 4746 (N.Y. 2006)   Cited 140 times
    Finding that even a fee agreement otherwise prohibited as unconscionable may be enforced if the parties entered into it knowingly and intentionally

    I. An attorney, guilty of professional misconduct in the representation of a client, must disgorge all fees paid; his conduct may not be ratified by the client. ( Matter of Phillips, 284 AD2d 897; Matter of Lippman, 232 AD2d 69; Teichner v W J Holsteins, 64 NY2d 977; Campagnola v Mulholland, Minion Roe, 76 NY2d 38; Orendick v Chiodo, 272 AD2d 901; Matter of Stevens, 252 AD2d 654; Schwartz v Tenenbaum, 7 AD2d 866; Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v Quadrino Schwartz, 370 F3d 259; In re Badger, 9 F2d 560; Hendry v Pelland, 73 F3d 397.) II. Courts have a duty to disallow unconscionable fee agreements, and such agreements may not be ratified by the client.

  3. In re Chamblee

    96 A.D.3d 1343 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 1 times

    He maintained an office for the practice of law in the City of Rochester, Monroe County. Respondent has not answered a petition of charges or opposed petitioner's subsequent motion for a default judgment, both of which were personally served on him. Under the circumstances, respondent is deemed to have admitted the charges and petitioner's motion for a default judgment is granted ( see e.g. Matter of Phillips, 284 A.D.2d 897, 727 N.Y.S.2d 729 [2001] ). Further, based on such admission and the proof submitted by petitioner, we find respondent guilty of the charged misconduct.