Opinion
October 16, 1995
Appeal from the Family Court, Queens County (Sparrow, J.).
Ordered that the order of disposition is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the fact-finding order is vacated, the petition is dismissed, and the matter is remitted to the Family Court, Queens County, for the purpose of entering an order pursuant to Family Court Act § 375.1.
At a little after 3:00 P.M. on November 17, 1992, the police arrested the appellant and two other adolescents who were riding in a car that had been stolen the previous day. At the fact-finding hearing, the arresting officer testified that, just before he apprehended the boys, he radioed police headquarters to request a license plate check and received a confirmatory response. The appellant made a timely demand for any so-called "SPRINT" report or audio tape of these transmissions, but neither item was produced prior to the fact-finding hearing, although the presentment agency admits on this appeal that both items were and still are in existence.
The "SPRINT" report and the audio tape of the arresting officer's radio communication with the police dispatcher as he followed and apprehended the appellant constitute Rosario material because these recordings represent statements of a person whom the presentment agency called to testify at the fact-finding hearing and because their contents relate to the subject matter of the witness's testimony ( see, Family Ct Act § 331.4 [a]; CPL 240.45; see also, People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, cert denied 368 U.S. 866; People v. Cortez, 149 Misc.2d 886).
On appeal, the presentment agency questions the value of the "SPRINT" report and audio tape as Rosario material. However, it is well established that if Rosario material in the possession of the prosecuting agency is not turned over to the defense, per se reversal is required ( see, e.g., People v. Cecora, 186 A.D.2d 215) "notwithstanding the fact that the evidence of the defendant's guilt may be overwhelming or that the prior statement may be innocuous or inconsequential to the cross-examination of the witness ( see, People v. Jones, 70 N.Y.2d 547; People v Ranghelle, 69 N.Y.2d 56)" ( People v. Williams, 165 A.D.2d 839, 840-841, affd 78 N.Y.2d 1087; see also, People v. Novoa, 70 N.Y.2d 490). Indeed, "a failure to turn over Rosario material may not be excused on the ground that such material would have been of limited or of no use to the defense" ( People v. Consolazio, 40 N.Y.2d 446, 454, cert denied 433 U.S. 914) because, as the courts have frequently observed, only defense counsel is properly equipped and motivated to assess the full utility of such material to the defense ( see, People v. Jones, supra, at 550).
Where, as here, a reversible error has tainted a juvenile delinquency proceeding but the probationary term has been served by the time the appeal is decided, the petition should be dismissed because no purpose would be served by a remittitur ( see, e.g., Matter of Carol L., 100 A.D.2d 762; Matter of Girard L., 92 A.D.2d 471; Matter of Tracy B., 80 A.D.2d 792).
In view of the foregoing determination, we need not address the remaining issues raised by the appellant. Rosenblatt, J.P., Miller, Ritter and Friedmann, JJ., concur.