cents" showing of the acquisition price of the property to establish a cost basis, the return realized by him from the sale of any other portions of the property, if there has been any partial sale, and of a bona fide effort to use, sell or lease the property in accordance with permitted uses. So long as the zoning classification is "fairly debatable", it will be allowed to stand ( Village of Euclid v Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388; Spears v Berle, 48 N.Y.2d 254; McGowan v Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434; Matter of Grimpel Assoc. v Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 431; Dauernheim, Inc. v Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 33 N.Y.2d 468; Williams v Town of Oyster Bay, 32 N.Y.2d 78; Salamar Bldrs. Corp. v Tuttle, 29 N.Y.2d 221; Koff v Incorporated Vil. of Flower Hill, 29 A.D.2d 655, affd 28 N.Y.2d 694; Stevens v Town of Huntington, 20 N.Y.2d 352; Curtiss-Wright Corp. v Town of East Hampton, 82 A.D.2d 551; Dodge Mill Land Corp. v Town of Amherst, 61 A.D.2d 216; Matter of Pecora v Gossin, 78 Misc.2d 698, affd 49 A.D.2d 668; Wackerman v Town of Penfield, 47 A.D.2d 988; Matter of Moore v Nowakowski, 44 A.D.2d 901, mod on other grounds 46 A.D.2d 996). We note that this standard of proof is to be contrasted with the much lighter burden imposed upon a landowner seeking an area variance for his property, which standard was incorrectly invoked by the plaintiffs in their brief herein, and was articulated by the Court of Appeals in Matter of Fulling v Palumbo ( 21 N.Y.2d 30) and was followed in Matter of National Merritt v Weist ( 41 N.Y.2d 438), Matter of Cowan v Kern ( 41 N.Y.2d 591), and Matter of Village Bd. of Vil. of Fayetteville v Jarrold ( 53 N.Y.2d 254).