Opinion
February 1, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Werner, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.
Contrary to the appellants' contention, the Supreme Court properly granted the petition for an area variance. Pursuant to Village Law § 7-712-b (3) (b), in determining an application for an area variance, a Zoning Board must engage in a balancing test, considering the five factors outlined in the statute, and weighing the benefit to the applicant against the detriment to the health, safety, and welfare of the neighborhood or community ( see, Matter of Khan v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 87 N.Y.2d 344, 351-352; Matter of Sasso v. Osgood, 86 N.Y.2d 374). Although one of the factors which must be considered is whether the applicant's difficulty is self-created, this factor is not determinative ( see, Matter of Sasso v. Osgood, 86 N.Y.2d 374, supra; Matter of Baker v. Brownlie, 248 A.D.2d 527). Here, the appellants failed to consider four of the five relevant statutory factors, and to engage in the requisite balancing test. Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that granting the variance application would have an undesirable effect on the character of the neighborhood or an adverse impact on physical and environmental conditions. Considering all of the statutory factors, the appellants' determination is not supported by substantial evidence ( see, Matter of Sasso v. Osgood, 86 N.Y.2d 374, supra; Matter of Necker Pottick, Fox Run Woods Bldrs. Corp. v. Duncan, 251 A.D.2d 333; Matter of Baker v. Brownlie, supra; Matter of Padwee v. Bronnes, 242 A.D.2d 334; Matter of Frank v. Scheyer, 227 A.D.2d 558).
Furthermore, there is no merit to the appellants' contention that the denial of prior area variance applications for the subject parcel precluded them from granting the petitioner's application. The prior applications were made by different applicants before Village Law § 7-712-b (3) (b) was amended to define the requirements for an area variance, and involved factually distinguishable proposals for constructing a dwelling on the subject parcel. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to the petitioner's application ( see, Kalpin v. Accettella, 160 A.D.2d 909; cf., Jensen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 130 A.D.2d 549).
Mangano, P. J., O'Brien, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.