Opinion
November 17, 1997
Appeal from the Family Court, Kings County (McLeod, J.).
Ordered that the order of disposition is reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, the fact-finding order is vacated, and the proceeding is dismissed.
The appellant contends that the evidence was not legally sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he entered or remained unlawfully in or upon certain premises. We agree.
In order to prove that a person is guilty of criminal trespass, the evidence must show that the person "knowingly enter[ed] or remain[ed] unlawfully" in a building or dwelling (Penal Law § 140.10, 140.15 Penal). A person "`enters or remains unlawfully' in or upon premises when he is not licensed or privileged to do so" (Penal Law § 140.00). The lack of a license or privilege to be in or upon premises may be proven by circumstantial evidence ( see, People v. Quinones, 173 A.D.2d 395). Viewing the circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the presenting agency ( see, People v. Williams, 84 N.Y.2d 925), we find that it was legally insufficient to establish that the appellant lacked a license or privilege to be in or upon the premises ( cf., People v. Quinones, supra).
The only evidence presented to establish that the appellant entered or remained unlawfully in or upon the premises was the testimony of a police officer, who chased the appellant into the open door of a house. The police officer testified that the people in the house jumped up and were in shock when he chased the appellant through the house and that one of the people yelled "What are you doing in my house?". Because we find this evidence legally insufficient to establish that the appellant lacked a license or privilege to be in or upon the premises ( cf., People v. Quinones, supra), the order of disposition must be reversed.
Thompson, J. P., Pizzuto, Santucci and Joy, JJ., concur.