Opinion
May 8, 1967
This is a proceeding to discipline respondents, attorneys, who practiced law as partners, based on 12 charges or specifications of professional misconduct. Both respondents were admitted to the Bar by this court, Pardo on December 14, 1949 and Haas on October 16, 1957. Three of the charges (Nos. 6-a, 6-b, 7) are against both respondents, six (Nos. 8-a to 8-f, inclusive) are against Pardo and three (Nos. 8-a, 8-b, 9) are against Haas. The Justice of the Supreme Court to whom this court had referred the issues for hearing and report has filed his report. He found that charges 6-a and 7 against both respondents, the charges against Pardo except 8-c, and charges 8-a and 8-b against Haas were sustained and that the remaining charges were not sustained. Petitioner now moves (a) to confirm the findings as to the charges thus reported as sustained and (b) for imposition of discipline. Haas cross-moves to disaffirm the report and to dismiss the petition; and Pardo cross-moves to limit his discipline to a censure. Descriptively, the charges which the Justice found sustained are: As to both respondents: (6-a) they represented adverse interests arising out of an automobile accident and (7) over a long period of time, and in many cases, they disregarded their professional obligations by ignoring telephone and written communications from their clients. As to Pardo: (8-a) he practiced law although he had failed to file the oath prescribed by sections 467 Jud. and 468 Jud. of the Judiciary Law; (8-b) he neglected to diligently prosecute the claim of a client in a negligence action and, as a result, the action was struck from the calendar; (8-d) he failed to return papers and business records to a client despite repeated and protracted requests for same — the report emphasized that as to this charge there was evidence that he never accounted for $3,000 escrow moneys which had been entrusted to him with respect to a real estate transaction; (8-e) he was negligent in the prosecution of a certain personal injury claim; and (8-f) he converted to his own use $600 given to him in escrow to discharge certain obligations of his clients in connection with mortgage financing. As to Haas: (8-a and 8-b) he retained portions of the proceeds of the settlement of two negligence actions, for the purpose of paying bills of clients, but converted the money to his own use — the proof was that in one case the bills included one by a doctor for $300 and in the other case the converted amount was $150 which also was to have been paid to a doctor. In our opinion, the findings as to the above-described charges are supported by the proof and are herewith confirmed. Further with respect to Haas, the findings that charges 6-b and 9 were not sustained are disaffirmed as to him and we find that these charges were proved as to him. Charge 6-b is that cash bail which had been posted by a client of respondents' was returned by the County Treasurer of Suffolk County to respondents, but the money was retained by them and converted by Haas to his own use. The evidence discloses that the Treasurer's $250 check, dated March 20, 1964, to Pardo's order was received by respondents' office and that Haas signed both Pardo's and his own name to the check and delivered it to a third party in payment of a personal obligation. Charge 9 is that there are 14 unpaid judgments against Haas and this establishes his financial irresponsibility to an extent which warrants professional concern. The Justice found, as the evidence disclosed, that the great bulk of the judgments ($4,621.01 of a total of $5,713.94) was for his and his wife's hospital and medical bills. While we do not believe that Haas should be disciplined on this charge, nevertheless, we disaffirm the dismissal of this charge. Petitioner's motion is granted insofar as it is to confirm the Justice's findings that charges 6-a and 7 against both respondents, charges 8-a, 8-b, 8-e and 8-f against Pardo and charges 8-a and 8-b against Haas were sustained. In addition, as above stated, we find Haas guilty of charges 6-b and 9. Respondents' cross motions are denied. Although we find charge 8-a against Pardo sustained, we do not take this into account in considering the discipline. In our opinion, Pardo is unfit to be a member of the Bar. He is disbarred and his name is ordered removed from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law, effective forthwith. As to Haas, we have taken into consideration his general attitude, his awareness of the seriousness of the matters involved and his sense of contrition, as contrasted with the cavalier attitude displayed by Pardo toward this entire proceeding. It is our opinion that suspension from practice for two years is an appropriate and suitable discipline for Haas. Accordingly, he is suspended from the practice of the law for a period of two years commencing May 22, 1967. Beldock, P.J., Ughetta, Christ, Brennan and Rabin, JJ., concur.