This Court has repeatedly held that a conviction under 18 USC §§ 1001 and 1002 is analogous to Penal Law § 175.35 ( Matter of Ramirez, 7 AD3d 52; Matter of Gautam, 231 AD2d 335; Matter of Pandit, 230 AD2d 160). In Matter of Roth ( 49 AD3d 144, 146), this Court did state that the "federal felony of making a false statement does not have a direct felony analog under New York law."
By petition dated January 12, 1999, the Departmental Disciplinary Committee now seeks an order striking respondent's name from the roll of attorneys pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 Jud. (4) (b). Petitioner correctly contends that automatic disbarment under section 90 Jud. (4) (b) is appropriate in this case because this Court has held that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is analogous to the felony of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree under New York Penal Law § 175.35 ( see, Matter of Fanta, 242 A.D.2d 172; Matter of Pandit, 230 A.D.2d 160; Matter of Marilao, 188 A.D.2d 146). Since respondent's felony conviction is "essentially similar" to a New York felony, he is subject to automatic disbarment. In a belated response to the petition, respondent, who is presently incarcerated, asks that the petition be denied pending the outcome of his pending appeal of his Federal conviction.
We have previously held that a conviction of making a false written statement to a public agency in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is analogous to a conviction of the New York felony of offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree under Penal Law § 175.35 ( see, Matter of Pandit, 230 A.D.2d 160; Matter of Hirsch, 214 A.D.2d 271). Since the offense underlying defendant's Federal conviction is classified as a felony, and would constitute a felony in New York if committed here, automatic disbarment is appropriate ( Matter of Hirsch, supra). Accordingly, the Committee's petition is granted and respondent's name is stricken from the roll of attorneys on the ground that he has been automatically disbarred upon the conviction of a felony as defined in Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (e).