Opinion
355
March 15, 2002.
Appeal from an order of Supreme Court, Erie County (Mahoney, J.), entered January 8, 2001, which, inter alia, compelled petitioners to comply in certain respects with subpoenas served upon them.
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, Albany (Kathleen M. Treasure of counsel), for respondent-appellant.
PRESENT: PINE, J.P., WISNER, SCUDDER, GORSKI, AND LAWTON, JJ.
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously modified on the law by vacating the provision permitting petitioners Barbara Humphrey Watts and Justin S. White to withhold information pursuant to CPLR 3122 (b), denying their petitions in their entirety and granting the cross motion with respect to those petitioners in its entirety and as modified the order is affirmed with costs to respondent.
Memorandum:
Where, as here, there is a conflict between the order of Supreme Court and its decision, the decision controls ( see, Matter of Edward V., 204 A.D.2d 1060, 1061; see also, Wills v. Wills, 283 A.D.2d 1023, 1024). In its decision, the court denied the petitions seeking to quash subpoenas issued by respondent and granted respondent's cross motion seeking to compel petitioners to comply with the subpoenas. The order, however, provides that petitioners shall comply with the subpoenas "with the exception that as to any materials felt by [them] to fall within some privilege from disclosure, said petitioners shall prepare and serve upon counsel for [respondent] a 'privilege log' in the form and detail required under CPLR § 3122 (b)". We agree with respondent that the order must be modified to conform to the court's decision ( see, Wills v. Wills, supra, at 1024; Pauk v. Pauk, 232 A.D.2d 386, 390-391, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 982). In light of our decision, we do not reach respondent's remaining contention. Thus, we modify the order by vacating the provision permitting petitioners Barbara Humphrey Watts and Justin S. White to withhold information pursuant to CPLR 3122 (b), denying their petitions in their entirety and granting the cross motion with respect to those petitioners in its entirety.