Opinion
March 16, 1990.
Gerard M. LaRusso for Office of Grievance Committees.
Peter E. Novick, petitioner pro se.
On reargument, petitioner requests this court to reconsider and vacate its previous order of mandatory disbarment ( 154 A.D.2d 949) because his conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1010 did not constitute a felony within the meaning of Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (e). In support of his request, petitioner relies upon Matter of Fisher ( 100 A.D.2d 656) wherein the Third Department held that a guilty plea to a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1014 was essentially similar to the New York misdemeanor of issuing a false financial statement (Penal Law § 175.45) rather than the New York felony involving false governmental filings (Penal Law § 175.35).
In the present case, however, unlike Fisher (supra), the conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1010 involves a false filing directly with a governmental agency and not a third-party lender. It was upon that distinction that the Third Department based its conclusions. Because the false filing was made directly to the governmental agency, we reaffirm our prior determination that petitioner's conviction of a Federal felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1010 is equivalent to a felony conviction under Penal Law § 175.35 which mandates an order of disbarment (Judiciary Law § 90 [e]; see, Matter of Brickel, 63 A.D.2d 448; Matter of Hopfl, 62 A.D.2d 161, affd 48 N.Y.2d 859). Petitioner's remaining arguments are lacking in merit (see, Matter of Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 494).
DILLON, P.J., CALLAHAN, DOERR, DENMAN and GREEN, JJ., concur.
On reargument, order entered September 25, 1989 vacated, and order of disbarment entered pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (e).