MATTER OF NORA M

6 Citing cases

  1. Sorrentino v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.

    397 F. Supp. 2d 418 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that district court did not have jurisdiction to enter order replacing person as guardian and representative

    It is equally clear that a prior criminal conviction can give rise to collateral estoppel in a subsequent civil action involving some of the same factual issues. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Dobbs Ferry Union Free School Dist., 19 A.D.2d 522 (2d Dep't 2005); In re Nora M., 300 A.D.2d 922, 923 (3d Dep't 2002). "There are two requirements for the application of collateral estoppel to an issue: (1) there must be an identity of issue which has necessarily been decided in the prior action and is decisive of the present action, and (2) there must have been a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling."

  2. In re Diana N

    34 A.D.3d 1058 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 8 times

    While respondent asserts that "people plead guilty in justice court to things that are not necessarily appropriate under [the] law," he has not denied that he is guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted, challenged the validity of his plea, or made any argument suggesting that he was not given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt in the criminal proceeding. Thus, we agree with petitioner that given the identity of issue between the two proceedings and lack of dispute over whether respondent had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in the criminal proceeding, Family Court property relied upon, the doctrine of collateral estoppel to sustain the finding of neglect herein ( see Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v James M., 83 NY2d 178, 182-183; Matter of Kali-Ann E., 27 AD3d 796, 798, lv denied 7 NY3d 704 [2006]; Matter of Nora M., 300 AD2d 922, 923; Matter of Denise GG., 254 AD2d 582, 583). We have considered respondent's remaining arguments and conclude that they are unpreserved for our review, unsupported by the record or otherwise lacking in merit.

  3. In the Matter of Eryck N

    17 A.D.3d 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 2 times

    Respondent raised the issue that the proof offered at the removal hearing was insufficient to show that the return of the children presented an imminent risk to their life or health ( see Family Ct Act ยง 1028 [a]). While we agree that this issue is moot because that order had expired upon the issuance of the final dispositional order ( see Matter of Nora M., 300 AD2d 922, 923; Matter of Joseph DD., 300 AD2d 760, 765, lv denied 100 NY2d 504), respondent's appeal from each and every part of the final order of neglect permits us to review the entire record since that adjudication was predicated upon evidence adduced at the removal hearing ( see CPLR 5501 [a]). While this appeal was pending, the Court of Appeals rendered the landmark decision Nicholson v. Scoppetta ( 3 NY3d 357).

  4. In the Matter of Thomas

    14 A.D.3d 953 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 17 times

    s vested with broad discretion, pursuant to Family Ct Act ยง 1051 (b), to allow an amendment of the pleadings "so long as a reasonable time to prepare and answer is given" ( Matter of Nikole B., 263 AD2d 622, 623; see Matter of Tina T. v. Steven U., 243 AD2d 863, 864, lv denied 91 NY2d 805). Finding the amendment proposed to be meritorious in light of the purpose of the hearing, coupled with the opportunity provided to respondent to present further testimony, we fail to find any prejudice to respondent and, therefore, no abuse of discretion. However, the order from which the appeal is taken had expired by its own terms on March 4, 2004. Respondent's argument regarding the propriety of that placement is now moot "particularly where, as here, a subsequent order extending placement was entered . . . [and], from which no appeal was taken" ( Matter of Trebor UU., 287 AD2d 830, 830; see Matter of Alexzander B., 287 AD2d 820, 821; see also Matter of Jason DD. v. Maryann EE., 4 AD3d 687, 688; Matter of Nora M., 300 AD2d 922, 923). Were we to consider respondent's additional contentions, we would find no error. Recognizing the great deference accorded to the Family Court, its factual findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are found to be lacking a substantial basis in the record ( see Matter of Kaleb U., 280 AD2d 710, 712).

  5. Dolary K. v. Kamrul I.

    2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 50803 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2016)

    In order to prevail upon her motion for summary judgment, petitioner must establish that respondent's conviction for Disorderly Conduct in the Criminal Court was based upon the same incident that is alleged to constitute the family offense of Disorderly Conduct in the petition before this Court. For purposes of this motion, the fact that respondent was convicted upon a plea rather a verdict after a trial is of no significance (Matter of Denise GG., 254 AD2d 582, 583 [1998]; Matter of Rosie B., 154 AD2d 900, 901 [1989], lv denied 75 NY2d 702 [1989]; Matter of Nora M., 300 AD2d 922, 923 [2002]; Matter of Diana N., 34 AD3d 1058, 1059 [2006]; Matter of Leon K., 69 AD3d 856, 857 [2010]; Matter of Adriel R., 117 AD3d 744, 745 [2014]).

  6. In the Matter of Jasmine R

    8 Misc. 3d 904 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    Summary judgment is a highly useful device for expediting the just disposition of a legal dispute ( Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v. James M., 83 NY2d 178, 182; Ferrante v. American Lung Assn., 90 NY2d 623, 631; Forrest v. Jewish Guild for Blind, 3 NY3d 295, 305). While summary judgment is not specifically provided for in the Family Court Act, it has been recognized that the court may grant summary judgment in a child protective proceeding or a termination of parental rights proceeding in order to expedite the resolution of a case where there are no issues requiring a trial ( Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v. James M., 83 NY2d 178, 182; Matter of Kyle M., 5 AD3d 489; Matter of Gregory George L., 19 AD3d 592; Matter of Jeovanny P., 213 AD2d 717; Matter of Brian B., 283 AD2d 424, lv dismissed in part and denied in part 96 NY2d 929; Matter of Nora M., 300 AD2d 922, 923).