Opinion
November 16, 1992
Appeal from the Family Court, Westchester County (Tolbert, J.).
Ordered that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the presentment agency adduced legally sufficient evidence to establish that he committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of grand larceny in the fourth degree. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see, Matter of Clarence C., 166 A.D.2d 442; Matter of John G., 118 A.D.2d 646), it established that the appellant stole a sum of currency from the complainant's person (see, Penal Law § 155.30; People v Sumter, 173 A.D.2d 659). Although the complainant's testimony that the appellant removed the money from his pocket conflicted with the complainant's prior statement that the appellant removed the money from the complainant's closed hand, this minor inconsistency was not sufficient to render the complainant's testimony incredible as a matter of law (see, People v Sostre, 182 A.D.2d 788; People v Torres, 179 A.D.2d 696). Moreover, we are satisfied that the Family Court's factual findings were not contrary to the weight of the evidence. In this case the hearing court was in the best position to assess the complainant's credibility, as it saw and heard his testimony first hand (see, People v Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). The court was aware of the discrepancy in the complainant's testimony and was further aware that the complainant had previously falsely accused the appellant of a larceny. Nevertheless, the court's assessment of the complainant's credibility should not be set aside unless clearly unsupported by the record (see, People v Keeling, 154 A.D.2d 620; People v Almonte, 135 A.D.2d 824; People v Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86). As the court's determination was amply supported by the record, it will not be disturbed on appeal (see, Matter of David R., 170 A.D.2d 453).
The court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in ordering supervised probation rather than an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal (see, Matter of Rufino M., 168 A.D.2d 385; Matter of Raymond A., 136 A.D.2d 700). Sullivan, J.P., Rosenblatt, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.