We agree with the Supreme Court that the Zoning Board's denial of the area variances was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. It is well established that in order to obtain area variances, a petitioner is required to establish practical difficulties (see, Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441; Matter of Cowan v Kern, 41 N.Y.2d 591). Though no one factor is necessarily controlling, the following factors have been considered significant: (1) significant economic injury, (2) whether a substantial change will be produced in the character of the neighborhood, and (3) whether the "difficulty" alleged by the applicant was self-created (Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483; Human Dev. Servs. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 110 A.D.2d 135, 139-140, affd 67 N.Y.2d 702). In this case, although the variances sought by the petitioner are fairly substantial, they are unlikely to have an adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood (cf., Matter of Town-wide Props. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 A.D.2d 757). The record establishes that the new building on the proposed lot would not affect the density of the neighborhood, since a number of homes in the area were built on one-half or one-quarter acres (see, Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483, supra; Matter of Krueger v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 48 A.D.2d 734). Moreover, we note that the Zoning Board had found a year earlier that creating a single-family house on the "Center Lot" "will not be injurious to the neighborhood, will not change the character thereof, and will not be otherwise detrimental to the public welfare."

Decided September 21, 1989 Appeal from (2d dept: 147 A.D.2d 483) MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL GRANTED OR DENIED

of the variances to petitioner against the detriment to the health, safety and welfare of the neighborhood if the variances were granted ( see Town Law § 267-b [b]; Matter of Pecoraro v. Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2 NY3d 608, 613; Matter of Ifrah v. Utschig, 98 NY2d 304, 308). Specifically, evidence of the obvious aesthetic impact of the nonconforming structure was presented in the statements of objecting neighbors, including the contract vendee of the immediately adjacent unit on lot 71, and at least one member of respondent visited the site. This provides evidence of more than mere generalized objections of neighbors ( see Matter of Ifrah v. Utschig, supra at 308), and it cannot be said that the negative aesthetic impact of the nonconforming structure in the otherwise uniformly compliant subdivision is not a public interest to be served by denying the variances ( compare Human Dev. Servs. of Port Chester v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Vil. of Port Chester, 67 NY2d 702, 706; Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Town of Huntington, 147 AD2d 483, 485, lv denied 74 NY2d 612). Here, respondent clearly considered the financial detriment to petitioner if the variances were denied, even though it "had no obligation to weigh the expense of compliance in the petitioner's favor" ( Matter of Carlucci v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Philipstown, 205 AD2d 688, 688) given the self-created nature of the need for the variances ( see Matter of Slakoff v. Hitchcock, 194 AD2d 613, 614).

The Supreme Court, after applying the balancing test required byVillage Law § 7-712-b(3)(b), properly concluded that the Board's denial of the application had been irrational and not supported by substantial evidence. Construction of the proposed dwelling would not change the character or density of the neighborhood (see,O'Hara v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Village of Irvington, 226 A.D.2d 537). Accordingly, notwithstanding the valid objectives of the zoning regulation, its strict application here would serve no purpose outweighing the injury to the petitioners (see, Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Huntington, 147 A.D.2d 483). BRACKEN, J.P., McGINITY, LUCIANO, and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.

Here, the petitioner has demonstrated "practical difficulties" since it cannot construct a single-family residence without coming into conflict with various provisions of the zoning ordinance (see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, supra; Cange v Scheyer, 146 A.D.2d 594). Once the petitioner established the existence of "practical difficulties", the burden shifted to the respondents to demonstrate that strict application of the zoning ordinance was necessary to promote and protect the public health, safety and welfare and that the need to promote the public good outweighed any injury to the petitioner (see, Matter of Sakrel, Ltd. v Roth, supra; Matter of Niceforo v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483; Matter of Townwide Props. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 A.D.2d 757). Among the factors to be considered are: "(1) significant economic injury * * * (2) the magnitude of the desired area variance sought * * * (3) whether the `difficulty' alleged by the applicant was self-created * * * and (4) whether the alleged difficulty may be avoided by means other than a variance, which may be feasibly pursued by the applicant" (Human Dev. Servs. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 110 A.D.2d 135, 139-140, affd 67 N.Y.2d 702; also see, Matter of Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v Barrett, 106 A.D.2d 748). In applying the above principles to the instant case, it becomes clear that the respondents' denial of the petitioner's application was neither arbitrary, illegal, nor an abuse of discretion (see, Matter of Pironi v Rose, 180 A.D.2d 740; Matter of Lakeland Park Estates v Scheyer, 142 A.D.2d 582, 583; Matter of Bauer v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 121 A.D.2d 627, 628).

In addition, the record sufficiently demonstrated that the petitioners' lot fell short of the minimum size required for any other use under the zoning ordinance. Therefore, the petitioners' claim of "practical difficulties" was established (see, Matter of Fuhst v. Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441, 445; Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483, 485; Cange v. Scheyer, 146 A.D.2d 594; Matter of Lund v. Edwards, 118 A.D.2d 574). Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and O'Brien, JJ., concur.

40 [3d ed 1989]). Since the petitioner adduced sufficient evidence of practical difficulties, it was incumbent upon the Board to establish that strict application of the zoning ordinance was necessary to promote and protect the public health, safety and welfare (see, Matter of National Merritt v. Weist, 41 N.Y.2d 438), and that the need to promote the public good outweighs the injury to the petitioner (see, Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483). In reaching this determination, a board must consider: (1) how substantial the variance is in relation to the requirements of the zoning ordinance, (2) whether the granting of the variance will result in a substantial change in the character of the neighborhood, (3) whether the difficulty of development within the parameters of the zoning ordinance can be obviated by some feasible method other than a variance, and (4) whether in view of the manner in which the difficulty arose, the interest of justice will be furthered by allowing the variance (Matter of Niceforo v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra, at 485; Matter of Townwide Props. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 A.D.2d 757; Matter of Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v. Barrett, 106 A.D.2d 748). Application of the foregoing standards leads us to conclude that the Board's denial of the petitioner's variance applications herein was not arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion (see, e.g., Matter of Bauer v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra).

Furthermore, the variances sought are substantial and thus more likely to have an adverse impact on the surrounding neighborhood, which is in the process of being upgraded through a community renewal program (see, Human Dev. Servs. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 110 A.D.2d 135, 139, affd 67 N.Y.2d 702; Matter of Siciliano v Scheyer, 150 A.D.2d 460, supra; Matter of Townwide Props. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 143 A.D.2d 757). While not determinative, the fact that the petitioner's hardship was self-created is a significant element militating against the grant of his application (see, Matter of Nammack v Krucklin, 149 A.D.2d 596; see also, Matter of Graziano v Scalafani, 143 A.D.2d 664; Matter of Lakeland Parks Estates v Scheyer, 142 A.D.2d 582, supra). Under these circumstances, the respondent's determination was neither illegal, arbitrary, nor an abuse of discretion (see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, supra, at 444; Matter of Niceforo v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 147 A.D.2d 483). Thompson, J.P., Bracken, Brown and Kunzeman, JJ., concur.

33, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 1995); Kleinhous v. Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Cortlandt, N.Y.L.J., March 26, 1996, p. 37, col. 7 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1996); see also Niceforo v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Appeals of the Town of Huntington, 147 A.D.2d 483, 537 N.Y.S.2d 579 (2d Dept. 1989), appeal denied, 74 N.Y.2d 612, 546 N.Y.S.2d 556, 545 N.E.2d 870 (1989). Courts have consistently held that zoning boards of appeal generally should not, and courts often will not, view substantiality in the abstract.