] In reviewing abuse and neglect findings by the trial court, it is our duty to "uphold the trial court's decision unless the findings of fact are `clearly erroneous'." Interest of D.K., 245 N.W.2d 644, 649 (S.D. 1976) (citing Matter of D.T., 237 N.W.2d 166 (S.D. 1975); In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455 (1970)). Therefore, the trial court's decision will be set aside only if after a review of all the evidence, we are left with a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."

See Davis v. Smith, 583 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Ark. 1979); People v. D.A.K., 596 P.2d 747, 751 (Colo. 1979), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 987, 100 S.Ct. 515, 62 L.Ed.2d 416 (1980); In re D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 596, 237 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1975). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28 (1975); Alsager v. District Court, 406 F. Supp. 10, 17-18 (S.D.Iowa 1975), aff'd per curiam, 545 F.2d 1137 (8th Cir. 1976); Knight v. Iowa District Court, 269 N.W.2d 430, 432 (1978); State ex rel. Health Social Services Department v. Natural Father, 93 N.M. 222, 225, 598 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Ct.App. 1979).

The transcript reveals that the trial court severely limited the appellants' proof for this period of time. Such a ruling by the trial court is contrary to our holdings in the Matter of N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134 (S.D. 1978) and Matter of D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975). The events in a child's life between the filing of the petition and the adjudicatory hearing can be the most significant facts of all; a judicial set of blinders, which disregards new and illuminating facts, could result in a finding contrary to the best interests of the child.

Constitutional challenges for vagueness or overbreadth mounted against statutory neglect standards similar to those in § 211.031, RSMo 1978 have been rejected in other jurisdictions. In re Interest of Metteer, 203 Neb. 515, 279 N.W.2d 374, 378 (1979); Matter of D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1975); People v. Schoos, 15 Ill.App.3d 964, 305 N.E.2d 560, 562 (1973); In re Neglected Child, 130 Vt. 525, 296 A.2d 250, 254 (1972). The courts in these jurisdictions consider the vagueness question in the light of the purposes which the neglect provisions are designed to accomplish.

We find that it is not. This Court has previously upheld the constitutionality of this statute in light of allegations that it is "vague and indefinite". Matter of D.T., S.D., 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975). See also People in Interest of D.K., S.D., 245 N.W.2d 644 (1976).

10; In re P.L.H., 1972, 86 S.D. 564, 199 N.W.2d 587. Our duty on review is to uphold the trial court's decision unless the findings of fact are "clearly erroneous." In the Matter of the Neglect and Dependency of D.T., 1975, S.D., 237 N.W.2d 166; In re Estate of Hobelsberger, 1970, 85 S.D. 282, 181 N.W.2d 455. One manner used to determine whether clear error has been committed is to determine if the findings are contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence. Jones v. South Dakota Children's Home Society, Sioux Falls, 1976, S.D., 238 N.W.2d 677; Ford v. Hochstetter, 1970, 85 S.D. 4, 176 N.W.2d 501. Using that standard, we believe the findings of the trial court are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.

State v. Loomis, 195 Neb. 552, 239 N.W.2d 266 (Sup.Ct. 1976). See In re D.T., 237 N.W.2d 166 (So. Dak. Sup. Ct. 1975), Moreland v. State, 531 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.Civ.App. 1975). "Stagnation in parental capacity" to care for children, or a "prospective inability for improvement", has been cited as grounds for permanent termination of parental rights.

And Wipf testified in person at trial on the same subject. "Where inadmissible evidence admitted at trial is cumulative only and other admissible evidence supports the result, the cumulative evidence, though inadmissible, is nonprejudicial." State v. Tribitt, 327 N.W.2d 132, 135 (S.D. 1982) (citing In re Matter of N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1978); In re Matter of D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 599, 237 N.W.2d 166, 171 (1975); Alberts v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 80 S.D. 303, 315, 123 N.W.2d 96, 103 (1963)). Being substantially the same as testimony admitted elsewhere in trial, Waldner's erroneously admitted hearsay warrants no reversal.

Where inadmissible evidence admitted at trial is cumulative only and other admissible evidence supports the result, the cumulative evidence, though inadmissible, is nonprejudicial. Matter of N.J.W., 273 N.W.2d 134, 138 (S.D. 1978); Matter of D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 599, 237 N.W.2d 166, 171 (1975); Alberts v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co., 80 S.D. 303, 315, 123 N.W.2d 96, 103 (1963). [¶ 15.] A review of the letter evidence indicates it was cumulative.

The other admissible evidence either supported the hearsay testimony or directly contradicted it. The jury's ultimate decision was supported by the appropriately received evidence and no prejudice resulted. See State v. Younger, 453 N.W.2d 834 (S.D. 1990); State v. Gerdes, 258 N.W.2d 839 (S.D. 1977); Matter of D.T., 89 S.D. 590, 237 N.W.2d 166 (1975); State v. Brewer, 86 S.D. 434, 197 N.W.2d 409 (1972); Alberts v. Mutual Serv. Casualty Ins. Co., 80 S.D. 303, 123 N.W.2d 96 (1963); State v. De Marias, 27 S.D. 303, 130 N.W. 782 (1911). Cf. State v. Fender, 358 N.W.2d 248 (S.D. 1984); Weber v. Bernard, 349 N.W.2d 51 (S.D. 1984) (error in admitting exhibit cumulative, thus, non-prejudicial).