In addition, the youth court referred to and attempted to satisfy standards promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and the American Law Institute. In Matter of N.C.F. (1982), 197 Mont. 390, 643 P.2d 236, this Court held that the youth court did not abuse its discretion in transferring jurisdiction to the district court where there was substantial evidence to establish reasonable grounds to believe the youth had committed the alleged murder, that the youth requires treatment and the community requires protection beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities and that the youth would not be rehabilitated by the available youth court services and facilities. N.C.F., 643 P.2d at 239. This Court emphasized that once a youth turns eighteen, Pine Hills School begins proceedings to dismiss the youth.

The crimes, attempted deliberate homicide and deliberate homicide, are serious offenses. Matter of N.C.F. (Mont. 1982), 197 Mont. 390, 643 P.2d 236, 238. Dr. H.S.N., medical director at Rivendell, testified that appellant suffers from schizotypal personality with a mild dysthymic disorder.

See Rule 28(A)(2)(a), Ala. R. Juv. P.; P.H. State, 504 P.2d 837 (Alaska 1972); Ark. Stat. Ann. Sec. 9-27-359 (1987); Graham v. Ridge, 107 Ariz. 387, 489 P.2d 24 (1971); People v. Allgood, 54 Cal.App.3d 434, 126 Cal.Rptr. 666 (1976); Conn. Gen. Stat. Sec. 46(b)-126(a) (1958); Fulton County Department of Family Children Services v. Perkins, 244 Ga. 237, 259 S.E.2d 427 (1978); State v. Tipton, 99 Idaho 670, 587 P.2d 305 (1978); State v. Everfield, 342 So.2d 648 (La. 1977); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, Sec. 3402 (1964); Aye v. State, 17 Md. App. 32, 299 A.2d 513 (1973); In re Welfare of I.Q.S., 309 Minn. 78, 244 N.W.2d 30 (1976); Miss. Code Ann. Sec. 43-21-157 (1972 Supp. 1988); In re N.C.F., 197 Mont. 390, 643 P.2d 236 (1982); Nev. Rev. Stat. Sec. 62.080 (1987); In re Vernon E., 121 N.H. 836, 435 A.2d 833 (1981); State v. Loray, 46 N.J. 179, 215 A.2d 539 (1965); In re Doe, 86 N.M. 37, 519 P.2d 133 (1974); In re Bunn, 34 N.C. App. 614, 239 S.E.2d 483 (1977); In re P.W.N., 301 N.W.2d 636 (N.D. 1981); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, Sec. 1112(e)(West 1987 Supp. 1989); State v. Little, 241 Or. 557, 407 P.2d 627 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 902 (1966); People in Interest of D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d 457 (S.D. 1977); In re Houston, 221 Tenn. 528, 428 S.W.2d 303 (1968); Dillard v. State, 439 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); State ex rel Salas, 520 P.2d 874 (Utah 1978); W. Va. Code Sec. 49-5-10(f) (1986); D.H. v State, 76 Wis.2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977). Many jurisdictions have specifically stated that a juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction is a final order.