Matter of Naughton

12 Citing cases

  1. Matter of Piercy

    96 B.R. 953 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1989)   Cited 5 times

    "Upon a judgment on the claim in the state court, the bankruptcy court can review the record, hear additional evidence if offered or desired, and then make a determination on the crucial issue of dischargeability." In re Mountjoy, 368 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (W.D.Mo. 1973); Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670, 671 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984). "(T)he debtor shall be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2) . . . of subsection (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a hearing, the (bankruptcy) court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge under paragraph (2) . . . of subsection (a) of this section."

  2. Matter of Remick

    96 B.R. 935 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988)   Cited 11 times

    This court must therefore omit rendering a judgment in this case and accordingly limit itself to issuing a decree of nondischargeability with respect to all damages which accrued from the playing of the musical compositions after the date of the unambiguous letter, August 7, 1986. The plaintiffs may reduce the claim for such a magnitude of damages to judgment in another court of competent jurisdiction, see Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670, 671 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984); Matter of Kakolewski, 32 B.R. 494 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1983), or in this court. For this purpose a hearing will be set.

  3. Matter of Brownsberger

    61 B.R. 22 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986)   Cited 5 times

    It is the underlying action arising under state law which, in these actions is incidental to, but determinative of the dischargeability issue, rather than visa versa, as is the case in most dischargeability actions. See, e.g., Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670, 673 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984). It is not possible, therefore, for the bankruptcy court to take jurisdiction of these actions on the frequently-employed (but somewhat questionable) ground that the underlying state action is only "incidental" to the dischargeability determination. For, as observed above, it is the dischargeability determination which is dependent upon, and therefore must await, the underlying determination under state law.

  4. In re Cummings

    221 B.R. 814 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1998)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that there was no reason to liquidate a debt in state court since the deadline for filing a complaint to determine dischargeability of the debt had expired

    a Insurance Co. v. Olmstead (In re Olmstead), 608 F.2d 1365, 1367 (10th Cir. 1979); Austin v. Wendell-West Co., 539 F.2d 71, 72 (9th Cir. 1976); Harris v. Fidelity and Deposit Co. of Maryland (In re Harris), 7 B.R. 284, 286 (S.D.Fla. 1980); Robinson v. Mountjoy (In re Mountjoy), 368 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (W.D.Mo. 1973); Ozai v. Tabuena (In re Ozai), 34 B.R. 764, 766 (9th Cir. BAP 1983); Roberts v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 168 B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr.N.D.Tex. 1994); National Credit Union Administration v. Harris (In re Harris), 135 B.R. 434, 436 (Bankr. S.D.Fla. 1992); In re Saunders, 103 B.R. 298, 299 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1989); Braun v. Zarling (In re Zarling), 85 B.R. 802, 804 (Bankr.E.D.Wis. 1988); Mutual Fire, Marine Inland Insurance Co. Of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania v. Frantz (In re Frantz), 82 B.R. 835, 837 (Bankr.S.D.Tex. 1988); Kowalewycz v. Sears (In re Sears), 68 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1986); Barrios v. Ruiloba (In re Ruiloba), 58 B.R. 700 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1986); Sapp v. Naughton (In re Naughton), 44 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr.W.D.Mo. 1984); Hoenig v. Hoffman (In re Hoffman), 33 B.R. 937, 941 (Bankr. W.D.Okla. 1983); Thomson McKinnon Securities, Inc. v. Hunter (In re Hunter), 32 B.R. 140, 141 (Bankr.S.D.Fla. 1983); Carter v. Larkham (In re Larkham), 31 B.R. 273, 277 (Bankr.D.Vt. 1983). In such a review, this Court must consider that if relief from the stay is granted, a debtor may be forced to expend substantial post-bankruptcy earnings in counsel fees and associated expenses in order to defend a state court action, or may be unable to afford to defend in state court with the result that an adverse judgment is entered against him or her, or may be forced to make a disadvantageous settlement because of a financial inability to mount a satisfactory defense in state court. If these results occur, the reservation of exclusive jurisdiction, and one of the primary reasons for it, would be undermined.

  5. In re Trippensee

    86 B.R. 195 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988)

    1 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 3.01 p. 3-64; 3-65 (15th Ed. 1987); 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1); Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670, 671 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984). In this case, it would be in the interest of justice to allow the action at bar to be decided by the state court as to liability for the underlying debt.

  6. Matter of Sears

    68 B.R. 34 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986)   Cited 4 times

    Therefore, the plaintiff has found it necessary to file a nondischargeability action in the bankruptcy court which, under § 523(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, has exclusive jurisdiction to determine such nondischargeability actions. Nevertheless, it is clearly within the discretion of the bankruptcy court to permit the claim underlying a dischargeability determination to be reduced to judgment in a state court or other court of competent jurisdiction. Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984), and cases therein cited; In re Mountjoy, 368 F. Supp. 1087, 1096 (W.D.Mo. 1973). If and when a state court judgment is obtained by the plaintiff, the bankruptcy court may then make the determination of its dischargeability vel non on the basis of the state court record plus any relevant supplemental evidence which the parties may desire to adduce. Matter of Naughton, supra; In re Mountjoy, supra.

  7. Matter of Burstein-Applebee Co.

    63 B.R. 1011 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986)   Cited 19 times

    52 B.R. at 533. See also Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984). There is no imaginable circumstance under which those of us who have long served in the ranks of the bankruptcy judiciary would attempt to utilize these principles to aggrandize ourselves with a status to which we cannot in reality pretend.

  8. Matter of Schwaninger

    57 B.R. 553 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986)   Cited 3 times

    The court reiterates its belief that to make the decision turn on the issue of liability vel non would be to arrogate Article III judicial powers to a sub-Article III court, an arrogation of power which should be authorized, if at all, only by the unequivocal letter of governing statutes or the decisions of higher courts. If the decision turns on the existence vel non of the underlying liability, it is an action which arises under state law, see Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984), which the bankruptcy court cannot determine under the rule of Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982). For this court to interpret the jurisdictional statutes to confer the jurisdiction and power to hear and determine such disputes upon the bankruptcy court runs the decided risk of converting an Article I court into an Article III court. "It has historically been held that the designation placed by Congress on a court as an Article III court or a non-Article III court is not controlling; the question is whether any of the federal judicial power is conferred upon the court in question . . . (and) it has in the past been held that a court initially created as a non-Article III court may `mature' into an Article III court by reason of being assigned a portion of the federal judicial power."

  9. Matter of Schwaninger

    56 B.R. 50 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)   Cited 1 times

    But this court cannot make this otherwise meritorious ground a separate and independent basis for not granting a decree of nondischargeability, for the underlying action on contract arises exclusively under state law. Consequently, under the rule of Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982), decision on that issue is outside the jurisdictional competence of the bankruptcy court. If the court had known that this issue was a significant one in this action prior to trial, it would have remitted trial and determination of this action to a state court of competent jurisdiction under the doctrine of Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1984). But the defense was not pleaded, with the result that this court proceeded to trial on the issue of dischargeability vel non.

  10. Matter of Mathes

    58 B.R. 4 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1985)   Cited 1 times

    After this initial issues has been resolved, the state court may, in the application of the appropriate federal law, make the dischargeability determination, see Matter of Kakolewski, 32 B.R. 494 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1983), or the action may be reinstated in this court for the dischargeability determination.         In the meantime, in accordance with the principles expressed in Matter of Naughton, 44 B.R. 670 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1984), and in the show cause order previously issued in this action, it is hereby         ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the within complaint be, and it is hereby, dismissed without prejudice, subject to possible reinstatement for the dischargeability determination if and when the state court determines whether the subject award should be made to plaintiff.