Initially, as the parties consented to a November 2005 order permitting petitioner to have therapeutic visitation with his son, the portion of the appeal regarding dismissal of the visitation and custody petitions is moot ( see Matter of Rebecca O. v. Todd P., 309 AD2d 982, 983; Matter of Baker v. Ratoon, 251 AD2d 921, 922). Without any record explanation of how petitioner's conduct was egregious and constituted an abuse of the judicial process, we must strike the portion of Family Court's order requiring prior judicial review of any future petitions filed by petitioner ( see Matter of Mulligan v. Mulligan, 175 AD2d 335, 336; compare Matter of Pignataro v. Davis, 8 AD3d 487, 489; Sassower v. Signorelli, 99 AD2d 358, 359-360). We decide this issue and the issue regarding sanctions on a procedural basis only, without addressing the merits.
o, 95 A.D.2d 80, 81). Given the unrebutted factual averments contained in petitioner's motion papers, however, it is apparent that he was unfairly deprived of any opportunity to make such a request before the conclusion of the hearing. His attorney failed to inform Family Court of petitioner's doubts about his paternity or his concomitant desire for an opportunity to ascertain conclusively, by scientific testing, whether he is genetically related to the child; nor was the court made aware that petitioner had asked that he be allowed to represent himself due to his conflicts with assigned counsel. It matters not whether petitioner had a statutory or constitutional right to counsel in this proceeding ( see, Family Ct Act § 262), for he should not have been constrained to accept such representation if — as he contends — he knowingly and voluntarily sought to waive any right he may have had in this regard, or decline the services offered, and proceed on his own behalf ( see, CPLR 321 [a]; Matter of Mulligan v. Mulligan, 175 A.D.2d 335, 336; Matter of Silvestris v. Silvestris, 24 A.D.2d 247, 248-249). Given the entirety of the relevant circumstances — including the less than compelling evidence produced at the hearing (significantly, respondent was not questioned with respect to whether she may have engaged in sexual relations with anyone other than petitioner at or around the time of conception), the alacrity with which petitioner sought a rehearing ( compare, Matter of Erie County Dept. of Social Servs. [Cebelle J.] v. Vaughn W., 197 A.D.2d 924, 925), the seriousness of the determination at issue ( see, Matter of Costello v. Timothy R., supra, at 934) and the basis for petitioner's motion ( cf., Matter of Jane PP. v. Paul QQ., 65 N.Y.2d 994, 996) — the most prudent course of action would have been to grant that motion, at least insofar as it sought scientific testing ( cf., Matter of Leanna M. v. Douglas J., 35 A.D.2d 551, 551-552).
Generally, a petitioner may plead and prosecute his or her own cause personally or through counsel (see CPLR 105[c]; 321 [a]; Herczl v Feinsilver. 153 A.D.3d 1336, 1337 [2d Dept 2017]; Matter of Mulligan v Mulligan, 175 A.D.2d 335, 336 [3d Dept 1991]). This right is expressly articulated in CPLR 321(a), which governs civil proceedings before this Court.
Generally, a petitioner may plead and prosecute his or her own cause personally or through counsel (see CPLR 105[c] ; 321 [a]; Herczl v. Feinsilver , 153 A.D.3d 1336, 1337, 61 N.Y.S.3d 302 [2d Dept. 2017] ; Matter of Mulligan v. Mulligan , 175 A.D.2d 335, 336, 572 N.Y.S.2d 91 [3d Dept. 1991] ). This right is expressly articulated in CPLR 321(a), which governs civil proceedings before this Court.