However, that error, by itself, is not jurisdictional and can be corrected by amendment. See, Montalvo v Bakery & Confectionary Workers International Union Local No. 3, 137 AD2d 506, 508 [2d Dept 1988]; Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [International Bhd. of Teamsters]., 298 NY 208 [1948]; Bohl Contr. Co. v IUE, AFL-CIO Dist. No. 3, 73 AD2d 1023 [3d Dept], Iv dismissed 51 NY2d 704 [1980]. The fact that the condominium's board of managers was sued without naming a proper officer in his or her capacity as such, in violation of Section 13 of the General Associations Law, is not a fatal defect but a correctable error.
As for Plaintiffs' reliance on federal and New York cases in which courts entertained suits against unincorporated labor organizations and local political party committees, such reliance is misplaced. See Pls.' Resp. at 12-14 (citing United Min. & Chem. Corp. v. United Mechanics' Union, 252 N.Y.S.2d 581, 582 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964); Matter of Motor Haulage Co., 81 N.E.2d 91 (1948); Montalvo v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers Int'l Union of Am., 524 N.Y.S.2d 249 (N.Y.App.Div. 1988); Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 437 N.Y.S.2d 895, 909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); Jund v. Town of Hempstead, 941 F.2d 1271, 1279-80 (2d Cir. 1991)). In Jund, the Second Circuit allowed for Section 1983 liability against the Town of Hempstead Republican Committee and Nassau County Republican Committee, despite their identities as unincorporated associations, in part because:
Section 13 of the New York General Associations Law provides that "[a]n action or special proceeding may be maintained, against the president or treasurer of such an [unincorporated] association. . . ." The rule is for the convenience of plaintiffs, who would otherwise have to name and serve all members of the association, Martin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 (Ct.App. 1951); Coleman v. Pokodner, 163 N.Y.S.2d 161, 164, 6 Misc.2d 955 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1957), since an unincorporated association cannot be sued in its proper name under New York law. Motorage Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 298 N.Y. 208, 212, 81 N.E.2d 91, 92 (Ct.App. 1948). Although Section 13 specifies the manner of service of process on labor unions, it does not specify a method of service on the president or treasurer of an unincorporated association other than a labor union.
As an unincorporated association, BTMI's capacity to be sued in its common name is governed, pursuant to FRCP 17(b), by N Y General Associations Law § 13, which permits an unincorporated association to be sued only in the name of the president or treasurer of the unincorporated association. See In re Motor Haulage Co., 298 N.Y. 208, 81 N.E.2d 91 (1948). Since service was effected on the treasurer and chairman of BTMI in their individual capacities and not their representative capacities, defendant argues, the Martin Act and common law claims against BTMI should be dismissed.
Since petitioner, an unincorporated association, has no legal existence separate and apart from its individual members (see Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C1025:2; see also Pascual v Rustic Woods Homeowners Assn., Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1006, 1006 [2015]), the proceeding should have been brought by the association's president or treasurer, rather than in the name of the association itself (see General Associations Law § 12; CPLR 1025; 2834-2838 Brighton 3rd St. Condominium v Bazinian, 66 Misc.3d 143 [A], 2020 NY Slip Op 50180[U] [App Term, 2d Dept, 2d, 11th & 13th Jud Dists 2020]). However, since "this error is not jurisdictional and can be corrected" (Montalvo v Bakery & Confectionery Workers Intl. Union of Am. Local No. 3, AFL-CIO, 137 A.D.2d 506, 508 [1988]; see CPLR 2001; Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [Teamsters' Union], 298 NY 208, 212 [1948]; Matter of Stephentown Concerned Citizens v Herrick, 223 A.D.2d 862, 864 n 2 [1996]; Concerned Citizens of Albany-Shaker Rd. v State of New York, 140 A.D.2d 842, 843 [1988]), it was inappropriate to dismiss the petition pursuant to CPLR 409 (b) (see CPLR 409 [a]) on that basis at this juncture.
maintained nor may judgment be entered against an unincorporated association in its proper name" (Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [Teamsters' Union], 298 NY 208, 212 [1948]). The only way to bring a special proceeding against an unincorporated association is to bring it "against the president or treasurer of such an association" (General Associations Law § 13; see CPLR 1025), unless the petitioner wishes to name each member of the association (see Martin v Curran, 303 NY 276 [1951]).
Congregation Lubavitch of Agudas Chasidei Chabad and Congregation Lubavitch, Doing Business as Lubavitch World Headquarters, were named, in each of the respective petitions, as unincorporated associations. However, unincorporated associations have "no legal existence separate and apart from [their] individual members" (2834-2838 Brighton 3rd St. Condominium v. Bazinian, 66 Misc.3d 143[A], 2020 N.Y. Slip Op. 50180[U], *1, 2020 WL 629764 [App. Term, 2d Dept., 2d, 11th & 13th Jud. Dists. 2020]; see Vincent C. Alexander, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C1025:2; see also Pascual v. Rustic Woods Homeowners Assn., Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1006, 21 N.Y.S.3d 687 [2015]), and "an action or special proceeding may not be maintained nor may judgment be entered against an unincorporated association in its proper name" (Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [Teamsters' Union], 298 N.Y. 208, 212, 81 N.E.2d 91 [1948]). The only way to bring a special proceeding against an unincorporated association is to bring it "against the president or treasurer of such an association" (General Associations Law § 13; see CPLR 1025), unless the petitioner wishes to name each member of the association (seeMartin v. Curran, 303 N.Y. 276, 101 N.E.2d 683 [1951]). While the petitions allege that respondent Zalman Lipskier "acts in a representative capacity equivalent to president of Congregation Lubavitch of Agudas Chasidei Chabad," we deem that insufficient to maintain a proceeding against Congregation Lubavitch of Agudas Chasidei Chabad, and note that this allegation was denied in the respective answers.
Since service was in compliance with the requirements of General Associations Law § 13, the defendant's first affirmative defense is stricken. Furthermore, although the plaintiff has brought suit against the defendant using its proper name and has failed to name either the defendant's president or treasurer, in his or her representative capacity, as a party to this action, as is required by General Associations Law § 13, this error is not jurisdictional and can be corrected (see, Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [International Bhd. of Teamsters], 298 N.Y. 208; Carpentieri v Redmond, 284 App. Div. 897; Bohl Contr. Co. v IUE, AFL-CIO Dist. No. 3, 73 A.D.2d 1023, lv dismissed 51 N.Y.2d 704). Accordingly, the defendant's second affirmative defense is stricken as well. Mangano, J.P., Brown, Harwood and Balletta, JJ., concur.
Since the Union is an unincorporated association, plaintiff's action was properly commenced against the Union president (see, General Associations Law § 13). The omission was a mere irregularity which did not prejudice the defendant Union since it was properly served through its president (see, CPLR 2001; Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [International Bhd.], 298 N.Y. 208; Miller v Student Assn., 75 A.D.2d 843). Special Term erred, however, in denying the Union's motion to dismiss plaintiff's sixth cause of action as untimely.
Order affirmed insofar as appealed from, with $50 costs and disbursements. Defendant, an unincorporated association, cross-moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it is being sued as a legal entity rather than by its president or treasurer. Special Term found that the defendant association has made a general appearance in the action, that the summons and complaint were served upon the president of the association and that the defendant was fairly apprised that its president is the party the action is intended to affect. In light of these findings, the failure to designate the president in his representative capacity as the defendant is an irregularity which may be corrected in the absence of prejudice to a right of any party. (See Matter of Motor Haulage Co. [Teamsters' Union], 298 N.Y. 208.) Accordingly, Special Term properly denied the cross motion.