Matter of Mitchell

8 Citing cases

  1. United States v. Friedland

    502 F. Supp. 611 (D.N.J. 1980)   Cited 7 times
    In United States v. Friedland, 502 F. Supp. 611 (D.N.J. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 672 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1981), the district court held that "a court constitutionally may suspend a member of its bar summarily on the basis of a felony conviction even though that conviction has not been finalized by completion of the appellate process."

    In re Mitchell, 420 U.S. 1001, 95 S.Ct. 1442, 43 L.Ed.2d 759 (1975). This action took place following the striking of his name from the rolls by the New York Appellate Division, First Department, In re Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, 370 N YS.2d 99 (App.Div. 1975), aff'd sub nom., Mitchell v. Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, and before the affirmance of that action by the New York Court of Appeals in Mitchell v. Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, supra. II

  2. Carter v. Bucci

    442 A.2d 865 (R.I. 1982)   Cited 2 times

    There is abundant authority for the proposition that conviction for a crime involving perjury is gross misconduct and warrants disbarment. In re Wright, 69 Nev. 259, 248 P.2d 1080 (1952); Matter of Foster, 60 N.J. 134, 286 A.2d 508 (1972); In re Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, 370 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1975); Matter of Kerr, 86 Wn.2d 655, 548 P.2d 297 (1976). In view of the foregoing, we conclude that the only appropriate disposition in the case is to order the disbarment of Mr. Bucci.

  3. In re Bucci

    376 A.2d 723 (R.I. 1977)   Cited 3 times

    Disbarment is the proper remedy, and other courts have shown no hesitancy in employing this sanction in circumstances such as those that are presented to us. In re Allen, supra;Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Green, supra;In re Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, 370 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1975); Matter of Kerr, 86 Wash. 2d 655, 548 P.2d 880 (1967); In re Caffrey, 71 Wash. 2d 554, 429 P.2d 880 (1967); see also In re Foster, 60 N.J. 134, 286 A.2d 508 (1972).For these reasons, I dissent.

  4. Matter of Frankel

    189 A.D.2d 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 5 times

    Respondent was also fined $5,000 on the perjury count and on one of the obstruction of justice counts, and assessed $50 on each of the six counts. Based on respondent's conviction for the Federal felony of perjury, petitioner Departmental Disciplinary Committee seeks an order striking his name from the roll of attorneys pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (b), upon the ground that respondent has been automatically disbarred upon his conviction of a felony as defined by Judiciary Law § 90 (4) (e). While petitioner, citing Matter of Sherr ( 93 A.D.2d 686) and Matter of Mitchell ( 48 A.D.2d 410, affd 40 N.Y.2d 153), claims that perjury in the second degree (Penal Law § 210.10) is "essentially similar" to 18 U.S.C. § 1621, thereby calling for an automatic disbarment of respondent, Penal Law § 210.10 applies only to false written statements, and in this instance respondent was convicted of giving false oral testimony ( 18 U.S.C. § 1621). Penal Law § 210.15, perjury in the first degree, a class D felony, however, applies to a false statement which "consists of testimony".

  5. Matter of Sherr

    93 A.D.2d 686 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)   Cited 1 times

    Respondent concedes that he was convicted of a felony under Federal law, but argues that this offense is not a felony under New York law, but is most analogous to the crime of perjury in the third degree (Penal Law, § 210.05) a class A misdemeanor. This court has previously held that conviction of perjury under section 1621 of title 18 of the United States Code was a felony under New York's Penal Law. ( Matter of Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, affd 40 N.Y.2d 153; Matter of Stone, 80 A.D.2d 93.) Respondent's attempt to distinguish the statutory scheme of section 1621 of title 18 of the United States Code and section 210.10 Penal of the Penal Law on the ground that New York's perjury statute adds an additional element of intent to mislead that is absent from the Federal statute, is without merit.

  6. Matter of Coven

    83 A.D.2d 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    Respondent also urges that to strike his name from the roll of attorneys at this point would be premature since he is entitled to an exhaustion of appellate remedies. This exact question was previously considered and determined by this court. (Matter of Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410.) It was there held that no such privilege existed. Once respondent had been convicted of a crime recognized as a felony in this State, he automatically ceased to be an attorney and counselor at law of the State of New York.

  7. Matter of Kilcullen

    55 A.D.2d 437 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)   Cited 4 times

    Additionally, as a matter of common justice, it cannot be said to be unreasonable or unfair to preclude the attorney from relitigating an issue when precisely the same issue has been resolved against him in another proceeding to which he was a party in which the standard of proof called for the highest quantum — beyond a reasonable doubt * * * and in which rigorous safeguards were imposed to insure against an unjust conviction". In view of the foregoing, respondent was automatically disbarred by virtue of his conviction at the moment thereof (Matter of Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, 411). The petition to strike respondent's name from the roll of attorneys should be granted.

  8. Matter of Rapoport

    54 A.D.2d 404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976)   Cited 4 times

    " Respondent, having been convicted of a felony under Federal law which is also cognizable as a felony under section 210.15 of the New York Penal Law, automatically ceased to be an attorney and counselor at law of the State of New York by virtue of subdivision 4 of section 90 Jud. of the Judiciary Law (Matter of Mitchell, 48 A.D.2d 410, affd 40 N.Y.2d 153; Matter of Ginsberg, 1 N.Y.2d 144; Matter of Levin, 24 A.D.2d 23). Respondent's name should be stricken from the roll of attorneys and counselors at law.