Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the mandates of the Family Court Act regarding parental notification do not apply in instances where the police arrest a juvenile as a juvenile offender, rather than as a juvenile delinquent ( see People v. Vargas, 169 AD2d 746, 747; People v. Bonaparte, 130 AD2d 673, 674; CPL 1.20). Thus, the police did not violate the defendant's rights under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution when they lawfully retained the piece of chewing gum, because the defendant freely discarded and abandoned it inside a cup that he handed to a police detective during the supposed taste test ( see Matter of Torry R., 220 AD2d 749, 750; Matter of Miguel C., 196 AD2d 868, 869; Matter of David R., 170 AD2d 453, 454).
Because Byrd's initial approach, inquiry and subsequent pursuit of defendant was appropriate and lawful police conduct, County Court's denial of the motion to suppress the drug seizure was proper ( see, People v. Leung, supra, at 736). Moreover, defendant's intentional discarding of the crack cocaine was a calculated act manifesting an independent intent to separate himself from his property and, therefore, its seizure was proper ( see generally, People v. Jackson, 251 A.D.2d 820; People v. Davis, 217 A.D.2d 805, 807, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 841; Matter of Miguel C., 196 A.D.2d 868, 869). Since the seizure of the drugs was lawful, the police had probable cause to arrest defendant on the drug charge ( see, People v. Leung, supra). Lastly, the record reflects that County Court properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant youthful offender status after consideration of his prior criminal history, the presentence investigation report, defendant's sentencing memorandum and the relevant circumstances of the case ( see, People v. Campbell, 245 A.D.2d 983, 984; People v. Diaz, 221 A.D.2d 749, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 921).
Even assuming, arguendo, that the confrontation with defendant rose to the common-law right of inquiry, it was proper since the officers had a reasonable suspicion that defendant had been involved in a crime ( see, People v. Hollman, supra, at 185, 191-192; People v. De Bour, supra, at 223; see also, People v. Javier, 175 A.D.2d 182; People v. Carmona, 172 A.D.2d 151, 152, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 963; People v. Rivera, 166 A.D.2d 678, 678-679, lv denied 77 N.Y.2d 843). The police search also was lawful following defendant's abandonment of his duffel bag ( see, Matter of Miguel C., 196 A.D.2d 868, 869). An abandonment is deemed to have occurred where the defendant has the opportunity, albeit brief, to reflect and purposefully discard the evidence ( see, People v. Rosser, 150 A.D.2d 911, 912-913, lv denied 74 N.Y.2d 746). After answering several unassuming questions, defendant intentionally threw his bag at Rogers and fled in the face of lawful police conduct ( see, Matter of Miguel C., supra, at 869; see also, People v. Parker, 163 A.D.2d 682, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 942; compare, People v. Glover, 215 A.D.2d 900). Hence, defendant's actions were a calculated act manifesting an independent intent to separate himself from his property ( see generally, People v. Davis, 217 A.D.2d 805, lv denied 86 N.Y.2d 841; People v. Kosciusko, 149 A.D.2d 620). Since defendant subjected Rogers to physical contact by striking him in the knees with his bag, probable cause to arrest defendant on the charge of harassment was extant ( see, People v. Moyer, 27 N.Y.2d 252; Matter of Jose M., 210 A.D.2d 228, 2
Contrary to the appellant's contention, the hearing court properly denied the branch of his omnibus motion which was to suppress a brown leather bag and the gun that it contained. The evidence adduced at the suppression hearing established that the arresting officer acted lawfully when he approached the appellant in order to request information (see, People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210; People v. Fitz, 187 A.D.2d 449). The appellant's act of dropping the bag in the face of lawful police conduct and denying ownership thereof when asked if it was his constituted an abandonment of the bag (see, People v Diaz, 80 N.Y.2d 950; People v. Toodles, 184 A.D.2d 674). Once the bag was abandoned by the appellant, the officer could properly retrieve and open the bag, and the discovery of the gun inside provided him with probable cause to arrest the appellant (see, People v. Diaz, supra; Matter of Miguel C., 196 A.D.2d 868; People v. Frazier, 191 A.D.2d 220). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency (see, People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620; Matter of Stafford B., 187 A.D.2d 649, 650), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the fact-finding order.