Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Ins. Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Matter of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

    5 A.D.3d 277 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)

    The application to stay arbitration was properly denied on the ground that it was not made within 20 days after service of respondent's demand (CPLR 7503[c]). It does not avail petitioner that it timely commenced a proceeding to stay the arbitration in Queens County, that the Queens County court ordered to be transferred to New York County, and that it instituted the instant stay proceeding only because of ministerial difficulties it encountered in effectuating the transfer ( cf. Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Coping, 179 A.D.2d 499). In any event, as the motion court also held, the petition lacks merit.

  2. In the Matter of St. Farm Mut. Auto. v. Kankam

    3 A.D.3d 418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 25 times

    Before: Tom, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Ellerin, JJ. The 20-day time limit prescribed by CPLR 7503(c) for serving a petition to stay an arbitration is jurisdictional, and, absent special circumstances not present here, courts have no jurisdiction to consider an untimely application ( see Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Coping, 179 A.D.2d 499, 500). While an application for a stay on the ground that the parties never agreed to arbitrate may be entertained even after the 20-day period has expired ( see Matarasso v. Continental Cas. Co., 56 N.Y.2d 264, 267), this is not the case here, where an arbitration agreement exists, and the claim is simply that its conditions have not been satisfied ( see Matarasso at 266; see also Matter of Steck v. State Farm Ins. Co., 89 N.Y.2d 1082, 1084; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Balthazar, 224 A.D.2d 303).

  3. In re the Arbitration between Propulsora Ixtapa Sur, S.A. De C.V. & Omni Hotels Franchising Corp.

    211 A.D.2d 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 14 times
    Holding the FAA did not preempt because the FAA was "silent" as to arbitrability of a limitations period

    The IAS Court erred when it permitted petitioner to commence the underlying proceeding fifty-four days after being served with Omni's notice of intention to arbitrate. The twenty-day limitations period set forth in CPLR 7503 (c) is to be strictly enforced and the court has no jurisdiction, unless there was never an agreement to arbitrate, to entertain an untimely application (Matter of Worldwide Ins. Group v. Wing, 202 A.D.2d 682, 683; Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Liab. Ins. Co. v Hancock, 183 A.D.2d 831, 832; Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. [Coping], 179 A.D.2d 499, 500; Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. [Vitucci], 151 A.D.2d 430, affd 74 N.Y.2d 879). The petitioner herein invokes two grounds for a stay of arbitration: that the Agreement was unlawful because Omni was not licensed to do business in Mexico; and that the Agreement was unenforceable because it was not notarized as required by Mexican law.

  4. Matter of Metro. Prop. Liab. Ins v. Hancock

    183 A.D.2d 831 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)   Cited 21 times

    CPLR 7503 (c) requires that an application to stay arbitration must be made within 20 days after the service of the demand for arbitration. This limitation is strictly enforced and a court has no jurisdiction to entertain an untimely application (see, Matter of Metropolitan Prop. Cas. Ins. Co. [Coping], 179 A.D.2d 499; Matter of Allcity Ins. Co. [Vitucci], 151 A.D.2d 430, affd 74 N.Y.2d 879; Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Bonilla, 116 A.D.2d 571). Moreover, failure to move to stay arbitration within this time period is a bar to judicial intrusion into arbitration proceedings (see, Aetna Life Cas. Co. v. Stekarids, 34 N.Y.2d 182, 186; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maloney, 111 A.D.2d 917, 918).

  5. In re of Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. De Liriano

    2025 N.Y. Slip Op. 30037 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2025)

    As this court explained it in the June 28, 2024 order and judgment, pursuant to CPLR 7503(c), "an application to stay arbitration must be made by the party served within twenty days after service upon him of the notice or demand, or he shall be so precluded." "It is well settled that the time limitation prescribed by CPLR § 7503(c) is jurisdictional, and, absent special circumstances, courts have no jurisdiction to consider an untimely application" (Matter of Metropolitan Property &Cas. Ins. Co. v Coping, 179 A.D.2d 499, 500 [1st Dept 1992]). '"This statutory time period is to be strictly construed'" (Matter of GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v Glazer, 173 A.D.3d 499, 499 [1st Dept 2019], quoting Gold Mills v Pleasure Sports, 85 A.D.2d 527, 528, [1st Dept 1981]).

  6. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Liriano

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 32637 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2024)

    Pursuant to CPLR 7503(c), "an application to stay arbitration must be made by the party served within twenty days after service upon him of the notice or demand, or he shall be so precluded." "It is well settled that the time limitation prescribed by CPLR §7503(c) is jurisdictional, and, absent special circumstances, courts have no jurisdiction to consider an untimely application" (Matter of Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v Coping, 179 A.D.2d 499, 500 [1st Dept 1992]). "'This statutory time period is to be strictly construed'" (Matter of GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. vGlazer, 173 A.D.3d 499, 499 [1st Dept 2019], quoting Gold Mills v Pleasure Sports, 85 A.D.2d 527, 528, [1st Dept 1981]).

  7. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Wrubleski

    2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 32727 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    The twenty-day time limit to apply for a stay under CPLR 7503(c) is treated as a statute of limitations, rendering courts powerless to entertain a late application addressed to the threshold questions. See, Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v Stekardis, 34 NY2d 182, 18586 (1974); Allstate Insurance Company v Calderon, 14 AD3d 698, 698-699 (2nd Dept. 2005); Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Co. v Hancock, 183 AD2d 831 (2nd Dept. 1992); Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v Coping, 179 AD2d 499 (1st Dept. 1992). "The lateness of even one day results in a complete forfeiture of the insurer's right to content compliance with an arbitration agreement or to challenge the failure to fulfill a condition precedent to arbitration [cit. om]."

  8. State Farm Ins. Co. v. Wrubleski

    37 Misc. 3d 1216 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012)

    The twenty-day time limit to apply for a stay under CPLR 7503(c) is treated as a statute of limitations, rendering courts powerless to entertain a late application addressed to the threshold questions. See, Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Stekardis, 34 N.Y.2d 182, 185–86 (1974); Allstate Insurance Company v. Calderon, 14 AD3d 698, 698–699 (2nd Dept.2005); Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Co. v. Hancock, 183 A.D.2d 831 (2nd Dept.1992); Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Coping, 179 A.D.2d 499 (1st Dept.1992). “The lateness of even one day results in a complete forfeiture of the insurer's right to content compliance with an arbitration agreement or to challenge the failure to fulfill a condition precedent to arbitration [cit. om].”