The Referee has recommended a two-month suspension, giving mitigating weight to respondent's essentially unblemished legal career of 24 years (he was once informally admonished for not diligently filing a summons and complaint), his military and family background, his excellent over-all reputation in his community, and his long-standing practice of offering his services, without compensation, to school boards, hospital boards, and other civic and charitable organizations. Respondent asks that our sanction be limited to censure, urging that his background and the facts underlying his conviction fall more closely within the compass of such cases as Matter of Wolk ( 61 A.D.2d 691, supra), and Matter of Driscoll ( 54 A.D.2d 99; see also, Matter of McGratty, 89 A.D.2d 246; Matter of Fahy, 87 A.D.2d 340; Matter of Claybrook, 82 A.D.2d 447; Matter of McNiff, 48 A.D.2d 408). We agree.

Respondent does not deny the conviction but contends that a conviction for failure to file income tax returns does not establish professional misconduct. In the absence of very special circumstances, a conviction for failure to file income taxes constitutes professional misconduct. (Matter of McNiff, 48 A.D.2d 408; Matter of Jaffe, 42 A.D.2d 26; Matter of Bernstein, 31 A.D.2d 213; Matter of Landis, 21 A.D.2d 488.) None is shown here. We, therefore, confirm the Referee's report sustaining the charge of professional misconduct. As for the sanction to be imposed, we are mindful that respondent has had an otherwise satisfactory record during the 23 years since his admission to the Bar, that for the period of time involved he was beset with serious personal problems, that there appears to have been no dishonesty on respondent's part in the sense of filing a false return, that in each of the years involved, he procured extensions of time to file, and that in the final analysis, no one but respondent was hurt by his misconduct.

The established rule is that such a conviction does constitute professional misconduct, at least in the absence of very special circumstances. (Matter of McNiff, 48 A.D.2d 408; Matter of Landis, 21 A.D.2d 488. Cf. Matter of Anonymous No. 1, 45 A.D.2d 88; Matter of Anonymous No. 2, 45 A.D.2d 89.) We think that this rule is correct and should not be overruled. Nor do we find in the present case the kind of very special circumstances that would cause respondent's conduct not to be professional misconduct.