Additionally, prohibition is not available where its proponent has an adequate alternative remedy at law, and Da Silva was not without "another adequate remedy" since she has sought relief from Judge Moulton's order by a motion to vacate pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) ( Matter of Crain Communications v Hughes, 74 NY2d 626). Indeed, the appropriate remedy to review any claimed error in a Civil Court order or judgment is through the appellate process ( Matter of McGuire v Spires, 214 AD2d 402 [1st Dept 1995]; see also 22 NYCRR 640.1, 730.1 (b); NY Const., art VI, § 8). Therefore, a writ of prohibition will not lie and the instant petition must be dismissed ( see Maddox, supra).

An argument can be made that Supreme Court in Pultz II had no jurisdiction essentially to reverse Judge Wendt, who decided in Zambrano (Index No. 67540/05, at 4) that no limitation exists on the amount of space an owner may recover possession for personal or family use — that only the Appellate Term may do so. ( See e.g. Matter of Maddox v. Milin, 2006 NY Slip Op 50814 [U], *3, 2006 WL 1222367, at *2, 2006 NY Misc LEXIS 1065, at *6 [Sup Ct, NY County, Apr. 28, 2006] ["The appropriate remedy to review any claimed error in a Civil Court order or judgment is through the appellate process."], citing NY Const Art. 6 § 8; 22 NYCRR §§ 640.1 and 730.1 [b]; McGuire v. Spires, 214 AD2d 402 [1st Dept 1995].) Leaving aside that argument, this court respectfully disagrees on the merits with the reasoning behind Pultz I and Pultz II.

The appropriate remedy to review any claimed error in a Civil Court order or judgment is through the appellate process. ( McGuire v. Spires, 214 AD2d 402 [1st Dept 1995]; also 22 NYCRR §§ 640.1 and 730.1(b) also NY Const. Art. 6 § 8). Therefore, a writ of prohibition will not lie and the instant petition must be dismissed.

Since a claimed error of law is reviewable on appeal, the orderly appellate process should not be undermined by utilizing an Article 78 special proceeding.Pirro v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 351 (1996); In the Matter of Dennis McGuire et. al. v. Mark H. Spires, 214 A.D.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1995), app. dism. 86 N.Y.2d 830 (1995). Apparently there is concern that if testing is routinely ordered at the outset of any challenge, the statutory language specifically permitting a challenge for "fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact" will be rendered meaningless as will the "burden of proof" language.

Since a claimed error of law is reviewable on appeal, the orderly appellate process should not be undermined by utilizing an article 78 special proceeding. (Matter of Pirro v Angiolillo, 89 NY2d 351 [1996]; Matter of McGuire v Spires, 214 AD2d 402 [1st Dept 1995], appeal dismissed 86 NY2d 830 [1995].) Apparently there is concern that if testing is routinely ordered at the outset of any challenge, the statutory language specifically permitting a challenge for "fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact" will be rendered meaningless as will the "burden of proof" language (Family Ct Act § 516-a [b]).