However, the relation of attorney and client does not forbid the parties from dealing with each other, and it has been held that a deed made by a grantor with full knowledge of its nature and effect, and because of the deliberate, voluntary and intelligent desire upon the part of the grantor, who happened to be a client, will not be set aside. ( Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; Winkelman v. Winkelman, 307 Ill. 249; Masterson v. Wall, 365 Ill. 102.) It is also true that where a fiduciary relation exists, the burden of proof is on the grantee or beneficiary of an instrument executed during the existence of such relationship to show the fairness of the transaction, and that it was equitable and just and did not proceed from undue influence. Suchy v. Hajicek, 364 Ill. 502; Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170.) This general principle applies to a contract between an attorney and client made during the existence of such relation, and afterwards attacked by the client.
As indicated above, old age and feeble health of a grantor, in the absence of a fiduciary relationship, do not, alone, justify setting aside a deed if the grantor is able to understand the nature of the business and the effect of what he is doing. Masterson v. Wall, 365 Ill. 102; Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; Rutherford v. Schneider, 307 Ill. 28; Sargent v. Robert, 265 Ill. 210. The question then arises for determination whether or not the facts in evidence in this case established a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the defendant and Mrs. Schumacher, so as to throw the burden of proof on the defendant to justify the transaction.
The fact that a deed was made between parties standing in a fiducary relation does not necessarily require that the transaction be set aside. ( Masterson v. Wall, 365 Ill. 102; Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170.) Where a confidential relation exists and the dominant party is the grantee of a deed executed during the existence of the relationship, the conveyance between the parties is presumptively fraudulent, and the burden rests upon the grantee to show the fairness of the transaction and that it was equitable and just and did not proceed from undue influence. ( Schueler v. Blomstrand, 394 Ill. 600; Brod v. Brod, 390 Ill. 312.) The evidence for defendant discloses that plaintiff knew she was the sole owner of the farm and the house in the city and that full disclosure of this fact was made to her prior to the execution of the deed.
(Jackson v. Pillsbury, 380 Ill. 554.) Conversely, it is equally well established, as defendant maintains, that the mere existence of a fiduciary relation does not invalidate every transaction between the parties. (Matanic v. Krajach, 392 Ill. 547; Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; Pillsbury v. Bruns, 301 Ill. 578; Ziegler v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180.) Indeed, such contracts and transactions generally, if open, fair, and honest when deliberately made, are as valid as contracts between other parties. Important factors in determining whether a particular transaction is fair include a showing by the fiduciary (1) that he has made a free and frank disclosure of all the relevant information which he had; (2) that the consideration was adequate, and (3) that the principal had competent and independent advice before completing the transaction. 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, sec. 493; Masterson v. Wall, 365 Ill. 102; Thomas v. Whitney, 186 Ill. 225.
A deed will not be held invalid, however, if made by the grantor with full knowledge of its nature and effect and because of the deliberate, voluntary and intelligent desire of the grantor. (Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; Winkelman v. Winkelman, 307 id. 249; Pillsbury v. Bruns, 301 id. 578; Valbert v. Valbert, 282 id. 415; Carlock v. Carlock, 249 id. 330; Kellogg v. Peddicord, 181 id. 22.) Where a fiduciary relation exists, the burden of proof is on the grantee or beneficiary of an instrument executed during the existence of such relationship to show the fairness of the transaction, that it was equitable and just and that it did not proceed from undue influence. (Suchy v. Hajicek, 364 Ill. 502.) Allen v. McGill, supra; Rutherford v. Schneider, 307 Ill. 28; Pillsbury v. Bruns, supra; Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 Ill. 480.) This rule applies to contracts between client and attorney made during the existence of such relation and afterwards attacked by the client.
Where a fiduciary relation exists, the burden rests upon the grantee or beneficiary of an instrument executed during the existence of such relationship to show the fairness of the transaction, that it was equitable and just, and that it did not proceed from undue influence. Addis v. Grange, 358 Ill. 127; Allen v. McGill, 311 id. 170; Pillsbury v. Bruns, 301 id. 578; Dowie v. Driscoll, 203 id. 480; Thomas v. Whitney, 186 id. 225. It may be conceded, as the appellant maintains, that he was not instrumental in causing the conveyance to be made. That sole fact, however, cannot give vitality to a deed obtained in the manner and under the circumstances disclosed by the record in this case.
It is well settled that where a fiduciary relation exists the burden of proof is on the beneficiary of the instrument executed during the existence of such relationship to show the fairness of the transaction and that it did not proceed from undue influence. ( Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; White v. Smith, 338 id. 23.) It is equally well settled, however, that even though a fiduciary relation does exist, a deed is nevertheless valid if entered into with full knowledge of its nature and effect and through the deliberate and voluntary desire of the grantor.
But, obviously, the existence of such a relation at a given time has no effect upon transactions between the parties which occurred prior to the commencement of the relation. In Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170, this court said: "Where a fiduciary relation exists, the burden of proof is on the beneficiary of the instrument executed during the existence of such relationship to show the fairness of the transaction and that it did not proceed from undue influence." And in Chaney v. Baker, 304 Ill. 362, the rule was explained as follows: "It is not the confidential relation which creates such a presumption, but it is the fact that the confidential relation is used for the purpose of procuring the making of the will.
The existence of a fiduciary relation does not render a conveyance void unless by reason of the relation undue advantage is taken of the grantor. ( Lang v. Lang, 284 Ill. 148.) Where the deed is the voluntary act of the grantor, with full knowledge of its nature and effect, and is in accordance with the grantor's desire and purpose, the existence of a fiduciary relation does not render the conveyance void. ( Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; Winkelman v. Winkelman, 307 id. 249; Roche v. Roche, 286 id. 336.) The intimate relationship of persons does not prevent or forbid the right to deal or engage in contractual relations.
Where a fiduciary relation exists, the burden is on the beneficiary to show the fairness of the transaction and that it did not proceed from undue influence. ( Allen v. McGill, 311 Ill. 170; Rutherford v. Schneider, 307 id. 28.) A fiduciary relation does not necessarily arise out of the relation of parent and child. Niland v. Kennedy, supra.