The district court's findings related to a determination that a person is chemically dependent will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991).

Id. But this requirement may be waived. In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991). Appellant argues that he did not waive the statutory requirement that the hearing on the petition must be held within 44 days or else be dismissed. He did not, however, raise this argument at either of his commitment hearings, even though it could have been raised there. See In re Buckhalton, 503 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn.App. 1993) (contending petition should have been dismissed because hearing was not timely), aff'd, 518 N.W.2d 531 (Minn.

A trial court's findings as to whether a proposed patient meets this definition "will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991). "When reviewing the record, however, we keep in mind the statutory requirement that supporting evidence must be clear and convincing."

The court of appeals has held that the deadlines can be waived by conduct of the patient. See In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991) (finding that appellant's failure to attend commitment hearings, which were scheduled within the deadline, resulted in a waiver because "[i]t would be an unreasonable result to permit a proposed patient to avoid commitment simply by not appearing in court."); see also In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Minn.App. 1995) (noting that "[a] patient may waive [the] requirements" of section 253B.08), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 1995); In re Buckhalton, 503 N.W.2d 148, 151 (Minn.App. 1993) (finding waiver of the section 253B.08, subdivision 1 deadlines), aff'd 518 N.W.2d 531 (Minn. 1994).

4 Lawyers' Medical Cyclopedia, §§ 32.47 and 32.47a (1989-3rd ed.). See also Matter of May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Min.App. 1991) (Affirming involuntary commitment for chemical dependency where "grand mal seizure disorder was caused by chronic use of alcohol, and the effectiveness of medication which prevented the seizures was greatly reduced by alcohol use.") T.H.'s epilepsy, or his symptoms of seizures, does not mean that T.H. is not mentally ill, or not chemically dependent. Only experts can explain the relationship between T.H.'s symptoms of seizures, his mental condition, and his need for treatment.

We first held that a proposed patient who failed to attend two scheduled commitment hearings waived his right to a hearing within the statutory time period. In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991) (construing predecessor provision requiring hearing on petition within forty-four days). Relying on the holding of May, we affirmed the district court's finding of waiver in a case in which the proposed patient failed to object to the state's request for a continuance that extended the hearing beyond the statutory time restrictions.

Additionally, we agree with the district court's determination that a motorist cannot claim that his right to have a hearing within 60 days was denied when it is the motorist's action that takes the hearing out of the 60-day statutory time frame. See In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991) (upholding denial of motion to dismiss commitment proceeding because commitment hearing had not been held within 44-day statutory time frame, when patient failed to appear at timely scheduled hearing). The record does not contain any evidence that Brinkman objected to the new hearing date or that Brinkman sought a stay of the balance of the license revocation under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 2(c); therefore the district court did not err in concluding that Brinkman's due-process rights were not violated.

The district court had clear and convincing evidence from which to conclude judicial commitment was the least restrictive alternative, and that voluntary treatment was not appropriate. See In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn.App. 1991) (finding involuntary commitment least restrictive alternative when all previous attempts at outpatient treatment unsuccessful). 3. Lee argues that the district court erred by admitting hearsay evidence of his alleged use of crack during a pre-hearing court-ordered stay at the Anoka-Metro Regional Treatment Center.

The district court had clear and convincing evidence from which to conclude judicial commitment was the least restrictive alternative, and that voluntary treatment was not appropriate. See In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 916 (Minn.App. 1991) (finding involuntary commitment least restrictive alternative when all previous attempts at outpatient treatment unsuccessful). We need not reach the issue of Anoka's admissions policy under these circumstances.

Hall did not object to the postponement during the hearing or afterwards. Because neither Hall nor his counsel objected to the postponement of the trial, we conclude that Hall waived his statutory right. See In re May, 477 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Minn.App. 1991) (section 253B.08 conveys right that can be waived like any other right). 2.