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Matter of Marlene D

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jul 2, 2001
285 A.D.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

Opinion

Argued June 5, 2001.

July 2, 2001.

In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Kings County (Hepner, J.), dated November 10, 1999, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court, dated September 14, 1999, made upon the appellant's admission, finding that she committed an act, which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crime of criminal trespass in the third degree, adjudged her to be a juvenile delinquent, and placed her in the custody of the New York State Office of Children and Family Services for a period of 12 months.

Karen Elizabeth Morth, New York, N.Y., for appellant.

Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Elizabeth S. Natrella of counsel; Todd Garber on the brief), for respondent.

Before: DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., LEO F. McGINITY, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, SANDRA J. FEUERSTEIN, JJ.


ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant's contention, she was fully advised of her constitutional and statutory rights. Her admission was therefore knowingly and intelligently made (see, Family Ct Act — 321.3; Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238; Matter of Brian K. J., 223 A.D.2d 643). It is clear from the allocution that all of the elements of the crime of criminal trespass in the third degree were established (see, Penal Law — 140.10[a]; People v. Leonard, 62 N.Y.2d 404, 409; Matter of Luis C., 66 Misc.2d 907, 912). The Family Court providently exercised its discretion in ordering the disclosure of the appellant's hospital records pertaining to two hospitalizations for alcohol abuse, as those records were clearly relevant to its determination as to her appropriate placement. The Family Court's finding of good cause is supported by the record (see, 42 U.S.C. — 290dd-2[b][2][C]; 42 C.F.R. § 2.64[d]; Matter of Maximo M., 186 Misc.2d 266; Matter of Doe Children, 93 Misc.2d 479). The appellant's contention that she was deprived of her right to a speedy disposition hearing is unpreserved for appellate review (see, Matter of Michael P., 213 A.D.2d 717; Matter of Eugene S., 200 A.D.2d 574) and, in any event, is without merit (see, Family Ct Act — 350.1; Matter of Douglas L., 232 A.D.2d 489; Matter of Perry O., 232 A.D.2d 225; Matter of Eddie M., 196 A.D.2d 25).

RITTER, J.P., McGINITY, LUCIANO and FEUERSTEIN, JJ., concur.


Summaries of

Matter of Marlene D

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department
Jul 2, 2001
285 A.D.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
Case details for

Matter of Marlene D

Case Details

Full title:IN THE MATTER OF MARLENE D. (ANONYMOUS), appellant

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Jul 2, 2001

Citations

285 A.D.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
727 N.Y.S.2d 338

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