Here, the Family Court never apprised the appellant of his right to remain silent—not at the initial appearance on the PINS petition, nor prior to accepting his admission to the allegations in the petition and entering the ACD order, nor at the fact-finding and dispositional hearing on March 1, 2017, addressing the alleged violation of the ACD order. The court's failure to advise the appellant of his right to remain silent cannot be considered harmless error (seeMatter of Mark J., 259 A.D.2d 40, 42–43, 696 N.Y.S.2d 583 ), as the court never advised the appellant of his right to remain silent at any time during the course of this proceeding or the original PINS proceeding. Thus, the order must be reversed (seeMatter of Daniel XX., 149 A.D.3d 1231, 1232, 51 N.Y.S.3d 683 ; Matter of Jodi VV., 295 A.D.2d 659, 660, 743 N.Y.S.2d 195 ; see alsoMatter of Chad M., 208 A.D.2d 541, 616 N.Y.S.2d 997 ).

Such proof, together with the presumption provided by Penal Law § 220.25 (1), which the factfinder found was not rebutted, provided legally sufficient evidence ( see People v Adorno, 216 AD2d 686, 688, lv denied 86 NY2d 839). As to each proceeding, we have also viewed the evidence in a neutral light, weighed the relative probative force of the conflicting testimony and, discerning no reason to reject the credibility assessments made by each factfinder, find the determinations supported by the weight of the evidence ( see People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490, 495; People v Brabant, 61 AD3d 1014, 1016, lv denied 12 NY3d 851; People v Williams, 301 AD2d 794, 796). Since respondent's placement under the dispositional orders has expired, his challenge to that placement is now moot ( see Matter of Kashayla L., 56 AD3d 962, 962; Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 43). In any event, his contention about placement is without merit.

That is, respondent claims that it was not the least restrictive alternative available, and he further claims that he was not given appropriate credit for time served in a detention facility prior to placement. Inasmuch as the dispositional order expired by its own terms in August 2008, these claims are moot ( see Matter of Andrew MM., 24 AD3d 1116, 1117; Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 43-44). Accordingly, the appeal must be dismissed.

The court then committed him to the custody of the Commissioner of Social Services of Franklin County. Respondent appeals, arguing that Family Court committed reversible error in failing to advise him of his right to representation by counsel of his choice as required by Family Ct Act § 741 (a). Although Family Court should have advised respondent "of his right to be represented by counsel chosen by him or his parent or other person legally responsible for his care" at his initial appearance and any subsequent hearing (Family Ct Act § 741 [a]), the failure to do so was harmless because respondent was, at all stages, represented by a Law Guardian ( see Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 42-43; Matter of Nicole EE., 233 AD2d 744, 745). Notably, respondent does not assert that such representation was ineffective or otherwise prejudicial to him. Accordingly, we find no basis upon which to overturn the adjudication and disposition made here.

Respondent asserts that Family Court failed to ascertain a sufficient factual basis during his allocution and, as a result, reversal is required. We disagree. Upon review of the record we are satisfied that Family Court adequately apprised respondent of the specific allegations contained in petition 2 and respondent unequivocally admitted to the commission of the acts alleged in that petition ( see Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 43; cf. Matter of Tiffany MM., 298 AD2d 728, 728-729). Furthermore, although respondent did not explicitly admit his intent to obstruct the administration of law or resist arrest, it can be sufficiently inferred from his admission ( see Matter of Justin ZZ., 214 AD2d 816, 816; see generally Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d 88, 90-92; People v Stevenson, 31 NY2d 108, 113; People v Clark, 241 AD2d 710, 710, lv denied 90 NY2d 1010).

Next, respondent contends that Family Court failed to advise him of his rights at critical stages of the proceeding. However, the record, clearly established that respondent was advised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel upon his initial appearance before Family Court pursuant to the requirements of Family Ct Act article 3 ( see Family Ct Act § 320.3; Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 43n [1999]). Moreover, respondent was represented by a Law Guardian throughout this proceeding, did not testify at the fact-finding hearing and, prior to making a statement at the dispositional hearing, was, upon the Law Guardian's request, again advised of his right to remain silent.

Respondent appeals. This appeal is moot as the 12-month placement period expired in August 2004 ( see Matter of Joseph YY., 306 AD2d 584, 585; Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 43). Ordered that the appeal is dismissed, as moot, without costs.

We agree. There is no indication that respondent was given an opportunity to review or contest the predispositional reports ordered by Family Court and to offer evidence during the dispositional phase of the proceeding, or that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to a dispositional hearing. Instead, the order of disposition was based on respondent's unsworn consent to placement in custody, given after a warning that she had the right to remain silent that was equivocal at best, and the unsworn statements of the Law Guardian and a probation officer. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the matter must be remitted to Family Court to conduct a dispositional hearing ( see Matter of Josiah R.R., 277 AD2d 654, 654; Matter of Ashley MM., 271 AD2d 796, 797; Matter of Tanya U., 243 AD2d 785, 786; Matter of Harry J., 191 AD2d 1016, 1017; see generally Matter of Nichole A., 300 AD2d 947, 948; cf. Matter of Mark J., 259 AD2d 40, 43). Respondent's remaining arguments are either lacking in merit or have been rendered academic by our decision. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, without costs, and matter remitted to the Family Court of Saratoga County for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court's decision.

Contrary to the contention of respondent, the court conducted a proper dispositional hearing prior to placing him in a secure facility. Respondent's further challenge to the restrictive placement has been rendered moot by the expiration of both the initial six-month confinement in a secure facility and the ensuing period of no more than 12 months of placement in a residential facility ( see Matter of Joseph Y.Y., 306 A.D.2d 584, 585; Matter of Mark J., 259 A.D.2d 40, 43-44; Matter of Leonardo Q., 171 A.D.2d 563, 564). In any event, we conclude that the court properly ordered a restrictive placement of respondent based upon the factors listed in section 353.5(2) ( see Matter of Noel M., 240 A.D.2d 231; Matter of Kristi L.M., 197 A.D.2d 903, 904; Matter of David B., 186 A.D.2d 352).

In June 2002, respondent admitted to the allegations contained in one of the petitions in full satisfaction of all three. Following a dispositional hearing, Family Court concluded that respondent had willfully violated the terms and conditions of his probation, and, by order dated and entered July 25, 2002, placed him in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services (hereinafter OCFS) for a period of eight months in a limited secure facility (see Family Ct Act § 353.3 [b]). Respondent now appeals, his sole contention being that Family Court abused its discretion by placing him with OCFS as this placement was not the least restrictive alternative and was inconsistent with his needs and those of the community (see Family Ct Act § 352.2). Respondent's appeal is now moot as the term of the OCFS placement in the order appealed from expired on March 12, 2003, eight months after the conclusion of the dispositional hearing (see Matter of Mark J., 259 A.D.2d 40, 43-44; see also Matter of Eddie E., 219 A.D.2d 719, 720; Matter of Angelina E., 213 A.D.2d 346, 347). Moreover, this appeal is also rendered moot by respondent's failure to appeal from a subsequent order of Family Court extending placement until May 14, 2003, respondent's eighteenth birthday (see Matter of Mark J.,supra at 44; Matter of Anna HH., 223 A.D.2d 880, 881).