Opinion
February 6, 1986
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Albany County.
Petitioner, who was employed as a therapy aide at Middletown Psychiatric Center, slipped and fell on ice after she had disembarked from an automobile in the employer's parking lot. The fall occurred when petitioner was returning to work after her lunch period. She filed an application for accidental disability retirement benefits claiming disability due to injuries sustained in the fall. Her application was disapproved on the ground that the cause of disability did not constitute an accident which occurred in the performance of her job duties. She timely sought a hearing pursuant to Retirement and Social Security Law § 74 and redetermination upon her application. The hearing officer found, and respondent determined, that the injuries were not sustained in the performance of her work duties and denied the application. This proceeding ensued.
Both parties agree that the sole issue is whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence. To be eligible for accidental disability retirement benefits, an employee's incapacitation must be the natural and proximate result of an accident sustained in service (Retirement and Social Security Law § 63 [a] [2]). In Matter of Smith v. Regan ( 115 A.D.2d 161) and Matter of Maso v. Regan ( 81 A.D.2d 734), this court sustained the Comptroller's determination denying accidental disability benefits to claimants who had sustained injuries while entering or leaving the employer's premises before or after the workday. Here, claimant urges that, while she was not actually performing her job duties at the time of her accident, she had not yet concluded her workday, thereby distinguishing the factual situation from both Matter of Maso and Matter of Smith. We disagree. Claimant was on her 30-minute lunch period when injured, clearly not in service or "engaged in the performance of [her job] duties" (Matter of Pucillo v. Regan, 98 A.D.2d 877, affd 62 N.Y.2d 736; see, Matter of Sorli v. Levitt, 77 A.D.2d 773, appeal dismissed 52 N.Y.2d 897, 900). The fact that the hearing officer found that the accident occurred at 12:30 P.M. and that claimant's lunch hour ended at the same time does not compel a different result.
Since the determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record, it must be confirmed.
Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Mahoney, P.J., Kane, Casey, Weiss and Levine, JJ., concur.