A parent seeking to vacate such an order in a termination of parental rights proceeding must establish that there was a reasonable excuse for the default and a meritorious defense ( see CPLR 5015 [a] [1]; Matter of Miguel M.-R.B., 36 AD3d 613, 614; Matter of Vanessa F., 9 AD3d 464, 465). The mother failed to demonstrate either of these requisite elements in her motion to vacate the orders of disposition ( see Matter of Miguel M.-R.B., 36 AD3d at 614; Matter of Ricky V., 4 AD3d 368, 368-369; Matter of Male H., 179 AD2d 384, 385). The mother's remaining contentions are without merit.
To vacate the default, the mother had to provide a reasonable excuse for her default and offer a meritorious defense to the proceedings ( see CPLR 5015[a][1]; Matter of Iris R., supra; Matter of Angel Joseph S., 282 A.D.2d 752; Matter of Latisha I., 238 A.D.2d 340) . The mother's excuse that she was delayed by the "unpredictability of the subway system" is unconvincing in view of the fact that she had traveled to the courthouse on previous occasions ( see Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384). Moreover, the mother did not establish a meritorious defense to the finding of abandonment ( see Matter of Iris, supra; Matter of James Edward M., 250 A.D.2d 685).
The evidence at the dispositional hearing supported the finding that the best interests of the child required the termination of parental rights and that she be freed for adoption, even where such finding resulted in the separation of siblings (Matter of Shaka Efion C., 204 A.D.2d 740). The court properly exercised its discretion in denying vacatur of the finding of abandonment made following an inquest since respondent did not timely file his motion to vacate (CPLR 5015 [a] [1]) and did not establish either a valid excuse for his nonappearance or a meritorious defense (Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384). The court also properly rejected as unsupported respondent's contention that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel where the evidence revealed that he had received meaningful representation (see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137).
Additionally, even accepting respondent's explanation in this regard, respondent nevertheless failed to demonstrate a meritorious defense. Although respondent averred that she had entered an alcohol rehabilitation program in hopes of reestablishing a relationship with her son, it does not appear that respondent successfully completed that program (see, Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384, lv dismissed, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1026). Further, respondent's claim that she was unable to attend scheduled meetings with petitioner due to transportation problems was both conclusory and unsubstantiated.
Moreover, the Appellate Divisions have weighed the merits of parents' motions to vacate defaults on appeals from orders determining such motions. In Matter of Patrick L. McC. ( 179 A.D.2d 220), the grounds were held adequate, but in other cases they were not, either because the grounds offered were conclusory (see, Matter of Shirley C., supra; Matter of "Male" Jones, supra; Matter of Raymond Anthony A., supra), specious (see, Matter of Antoine C., 176 A.D.2d 524), incredible (see, Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384), or because the parent offered no facts (see, Matter of Nathalie A., supra), or insufficient facts to support a meritorious defense (see, Matter of Linday E., 177 A.D.2d 276; see also, Matter of Celeste M., 180 A.D.2d 437; Matter of Luis R., 184 A.D.2d 1012). Considering this lengthy body of precedent and practice, we cannot accept the argument that the concept of inquest upon default is alien to parental termination cases, at least in practice.
In fact, it can be surmised that he intentionally neglected to appear because a warrant had been issued for his arrest on a criminal charge. Accordingly, in the absence of an explanation from respondent for his failure to appear at the hearing, I see no reason to abandon our reluctance to depart from the well-settled rule that a party cannot appeal from an order entered upon default (see, Matter of Celeste M., 180 A.D.2d 437, 438; Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384, 385, lv dismissed, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 1026; Matter of Jones, 128 A.D.2d 403, 404). Therefore, I would dismiss the appeal.
Family Court properly declined to hold a hearing to determine whether respondent's failure to appear was willful or inadvertent. In order to be relieved of her default, respondent was required to provide a reasonable excuse for her absence and proof of merit (see, Matter of Male H., 179 A.D.2d 384; Matter of Linday E., 177 A.D.2d 276; Matter of Jones, 128 A.D.2d 403). Neither showing was made by respondent, and Family Court was under no obligation to conduct an independent inquiry into the reasons for the mother's absence.