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upholding an ALJ's finding that the plaintiff was not credible where he "made sufficient inquiries into [plaintiff's] daily routine and medical and work history, and made specific findings to justify her rejection of his pain testimony"
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The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.
Editorial Note:
This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA9 Rule 36-3 regarding use of unpublished opinions)
As Amended on Denial of Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Nov. 10, 1997.
Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel James W. Meyers, Chief Judge, Barry Russell, and Calvin K. Ashland, Judges, Presiding
Before: HUG, Chief Judge, KOZINSKI and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") dismissed as moot Maalouf's appeal of a bankruptcy court order granting the trustee's motion to approve a compromise and settlement agreement with Ford Motor Credit Company. The BAP entered final judgment on January 2, 1996.
Maalouf filed a petition for rehearing with the BAP on January 16, 1996. The BAP denied Maalouf's petition for rehearing on January 31, 1996 as untimely. See Bankr.R. 8015.
Maalouf subsequently filed his notice of appeal on February 6, 1996, 35 days after entry of final judgment. Rule 4(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a party appealing a decision of the BAP file its notice of appeal within 30 days of the entry of final judgment. See Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1). Because Maalouf's petition for rehearing before the BAP was untimely, it did not toll the time for filing his notice of appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 6(b)(2)(i); Bankr.R. 8015.
Although court-appointed trustees are parties to this case, the United States is not. Thus, the additional thirty days allowed under Rule 4(a)(1) in suits in which the United States is a litigant does not apply in this case. In re Serrato, No. 96-15592, slip op. 7691, 7694-95 (9th Cir. July 1, 1997).
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1).
DISMISSED.