Here the presence of appellant's mother provided the core protection intended by the statute. We reject appellant's other claims of noncompliance with Family Court Act § 305.2. A child arrestee must be taken to court “unless the officer determines that it is necessary to question the child” (Family Ct. Act § 305.2[4] [b] ). Contrary to appellant'sargument, interrogation is not limited to exigent circumstances, and the record fails to support appellant's claim that he was too tired to be questioned. Finally, while the questioning did not occur in a “designated juvenile room” ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 305.2[4][b] ), the setting of the interview satisfied the requirement that the location be “substantially similar” to such a designated room ( see Matter of Daniel H., 67 A.D.3d 527, 528, 888 N.Y.S.2d 496 [1st Dept. 2009], appeal dismissed,15 N.Y.3d 883, 912 N.Y.S.2d 533, 938 N.E.2d 966 [2010];Matter of Luis N., 112 A.D.2d 86, 88, 489 N.Y.S.2d 206 [1st Dept. 1985] ). The court's finding was based on legally sufficient evidence and was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ).
I further note that, while Detective Comissiong was a novice at juvenile interviews and may not have had experience coping with an angry parent, he certainly recognized that Daniel's mother was hardly in a position to provide calm parental guidance. In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to address the impact of the unexplained failure to question Daniel in a designated juvenile room, although I note that there is no per se rule mandating suppression of an inculpatory statement for failure to follow the statutory procedure, and no claim here that the sergeant's office was not substantially similar to the designated room ( see Matter of Luis N., 112 AD2d 86, 87; see also Matter of Rafael S., 16 AD3d 246; Matter of Emilio M., 37 NY2d 173, 177).
Questioning of the appellant in relation to a separate incident was not improper despite the absence of his mother where the appellant, age 15 at the time, was in the presence of his older brother, with whom he resided ( see Family Ct Act § 305.2, [7], [8]; Matter of Anthony L., 262 AD2d 51, 52; Matter of Mark A., 250 AD2d 765, 765-766). Nor did the fact that the questioning took place in a room other than the juvenile hall render the appellant's statements involuntary ( see Family Ct Act § 305.2 [b]; Matter of Rafael S., 16 AD3d 246, 246-247; People v Ellis, 5 AD3d 694, 694-695; cf. Matter of Luis N., 112 AD2d 86, 88).
There is no evidence that the police engaged in prolonged questioning or made any promises to appellant to induce the statement. The delay in commencing interrogation was satisfactorily explained, and the use of a nonthreatening, office-like interview room instead of the temporarily unavailable and only juvenile room did not affect the voluntariness of the statement ( see People v. Ellis, 5 AD3d 694, lv denied 3 NY3d 639; Matter of Luis N., 112 AD2d 86). The court properly determined that detention in a limited secure facility, to run concurrently with a similar disposition for another previous delinquency adjudication, also involving an act of violence, was the least restrictive alternative that would promote appellant's needs and best interests while protecting the community ( see Matter of Katherine W., 62 NY2d 947).
The fact that part of the defendant's interrogation occurred in a room other than the juvenile interview room ( see Family Ct Act § 305.2[b]) does not warrant the suppression of the defendant's statements, since there was no evidence of "willful or negligent disregard of the statutory requirements [or] evidence of inattention to such requirements as a pattern or practice" ( Matter of Emilio M., 37 N.Y.2d 173, 177). Rather, the evidence adduced at the hearing established that another room was chosen on the ground that the juvenile interview room had been sealed off for fumigation to correct lice infestation. The hearing court determined that the interview room which was used was bright, office-like, not oppressive, and did not affect the voluntariness of the defendant's statement ( see Matter of Luis N., 112 A.D.2d 86, 88). Similarly unavailing is the defendant's claim that the alleged improper remarks made by the prosecutor during summation require reversal.
We discredit the testimony of defendant's witnesses, as well as that of defendant himself, that sought to establish that the police were put on notice of defendant's actual age from the moment they had approached him at home as well as at the precinct during the course of his interview. Since we conclude that the police were not aware that defendant was a juvenile, and find that, once the police were put on notice, they scrupulously honored the request of his mother that questioning cease, we find no violation of CPL 140.20 (6) or Family Court Act § 305.2 (3) (see, Matter of Emilio M., 37 N.Y.2d 173, 177; Matter of Luis N., 112 A.D.2d 86). Nor do we find any other infirmity in the hearing court's findings.
Appeal from the Family Court, New York County (Leah Marks, J.). Respondent was questioned in the presence of her stepfather in an annex to the designated youth room, thus satisfying the requirements of Family Court Act § 305.2 (4) (b) (see, Matter of Luis N., 112 A.D.2d 86). Moreover, respondent's statements were made voluntarily after she acknowledged her understanding of her Miranda rights. We note the fact that the police diligently searched for respondent's relatives for six hours while she was detained.
Respondent appeals a juvenile delinquency adjudication, based upon Family Court's determination after a fact-finding hearing that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute rape in the first degree and sodomy in the first degree, contending primarily that Family Court erred in refusing to suppress his written confession. We disagree. None of the coercive factors pointed to by respondent required a finding that the confession was involuntarily made (see, Family Ct Act § 344.2). While nothing prevented the police from questioning respondent at his home, the selection of the police station as the location of the interview was by no means unreasonable, particularly since respondent and his mother voluntarily accompanied the police officers and the interview was of reasonable duration and conducted in a facility designated as a suitable place for the questioning of children (see, Family Ct Act § 305.2 [b]; Matter of Luis N., 112 A.D.2d 86; Matter of Kenneth C., 125 Misc.2d 227, 230-231). Further, we find no basis in the record for a finding that the participation of trained child protective workers constituted "improper conduct or undue pressure which impaired * * * respondent's * * * mental condition to the extent of undermining his ability to make a choice" (Family Ct Act § 344.2 [a]).
ant which improperly authorizes a nighttime search, in violation of statute, need not be suppressed (People v. Glen, 30 N.Y.2d 252, 262; United States v. Anderson, 851 F.2d 384; United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1121-1122; United States v. Burke, 517 F.2d 377; Gamble v. State, 473 So.2d 1188, 1195-1196 [Ala]; State v. Brock, 294 Or. 15, 653 P.2d 543; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 315 Pa. Super. 579, 462 A.2d 743; see also, People v. Frange, 109 A.D.2d 802 [failure to return warrant in timely manner "ministerial" error not warranting suppression]; People v. Varney, 32 A.D.2d 181; People v. Crispell, 110 A.D.2d 926, 927 ["technical" defects in warrant do not require suppression]; People v. Vara, 117 A.D.2d 1013; People v. Hernandez, 131 A.D.2d 509). In Matter of Emilio M. ( 37 N.Y.2d 173), the Court of Appeals held it was error to suppress a confession which had been taken from a juvenile suspect in violation of Family Court Act former § 724, even though, as observed by the court in Matter of Luis N. ( 112 A.D.2d 86), compliance with the statute would have been possible. In People v. Coffey ( 12 N.Y.2d 443, 453) the Court of Appeals stated that it was doubtful whether a violation of a statute which required an arresting officer to advise the arrestee of the cause for the arrest would make the arrest illegal "to the extent of making seized evidence inadmissible" (cf., Ford v. State of New York, 21 A.D.2d 437, 440).
Cf. Matter of Emilio M., 37 NY2d 173 (1975) (forgiving lack of strict compliance only because judicial officials had not designated any juvenile facility). However, since 1985, courts have altered the analysis of violations of sections 305.2 and 344.2 to take a more pragmatic and less dogmatic view. Matter of Luis N., 112 AD2d 86 (1st Dep't. 1985). Recognizing that the prophylactic intent of the statutes was to incentivize law enforcement to treat juveniles fairly based on their age, and to question them under conditions less likely to intimidate and scare children than an ordinary police house environment, the current governing standard in the law is now whether or not the police "substantially complied" with the statutory mandates. Thus, for example, if the designated juvenile room is unavailable due to fumigation from a lice infection, and if the alternative space used does not affect the voluntariness of the child's statement, then suppression will be denied.