Here, father's central claim is that the trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. We have continually and consistently held that we will not set aside a trial court's findings unless they are clearly erroneous and unless, after reviewing the evidence, we are left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982); In re S.D., 402 N.W.2d 346 (S.D. 1987); People in Interest of T.H., supra; In re L.R., 394 N.W.2d 901 (S.D. 1986); In re S.M., supra; People in Interest of M.W., 374 N.W.2d 889 (S.D. 1985); In re A.M.L., 371 N.W.2d 358 (S.D. 1985); People in Interest of D.M., 367 N.W.2d 769 (S.D. 1985); People in Interest of M.J.B., 364 N.W.2d 921 (S.D. 1985); In re D.H., 354 N.W.2d 185 (S.D. 1984); People in Interest of S.L.H., supra; In re S.S., 334 N.W.2d 59 (S.D. 1983); In re S.A.H., 314 N.W.2d 316 (S.D. 1982); In re D.A.B., 313 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1981); People in Interest of T.L.J., 303 N.W.2d 800 (S.D. 1981); In re R.N., 303 N.W.2d 102 (S.D. 1981); People in Interest of P.M., 299 N.W.2d 803 (S.D. 1980). The facts in this case are unique to these parties and their sad circumstances.
However, we have implied that the least restrictive alternative and best interests of the child analysis is essentially an issue of fact for the trial court in that we have applied the clearly erroneous standard of review. People In Interest of D.H., 408 N.W.2d 743 (S.D. 1987); Interest of T.H., supra; Matter of L.R., 394 N.W.2d 901 (S.D. 1986); People In Interest of G.H., 390 N.W.2d 54 (S.D. 1986); Matter of S.M., supra; Matter of D.H., supra. The trial court must enter its final determination as a conclusion of law since it must decree its final judgment in the case.
Corn Exchange Bank v. TriState Livestock, 368 N.W.2d 596 (S.D. 1985); Scott v. Rooney, 65 S.D. 510, 275 N.W. 349 (1937). See SDCL 19-10-2; Matter of L.R., 394 N.W.2d 901 (S.D. 1986). The record first contains an order of the Orange County court dated in October of 1982, which is based on a stipulation stating that Grant owed $6,650 in spousal support payments to Irene at that time, including remaining future payments and arrearages.