Opinion
February 19, 1991
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Jacqueline W. Silbermann, J.).
It is well-settled that the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217 commences to run on the date petitioner is notified of the Board's decision (Matter of Edmead v McGuire, 67 N.Y.2d 714). Thus, the petition was untimely, to the extent it sought to challenge the Board's determination with respect to Parcel I. While petitioner argues that the petition is timely, because the statutory period does not begin to run until counsel receives the required notice, petitioner has failed to demonstrate, or even allege, that it was represented by counsel with respect to this matter (see, Matter of Bianca v Frank, 43 N.Y.2d 168).
We also reject petitioner's argument that the Board's determination, with respect to Parcel II, was arbitrary and capricious. Absent fraud or illegality, the Board has absolute discretion to deny the release of property acquired by the City through in rem foreclosure proceedings once the four-month mandatory release period has expired (Pig's Ear 515 Myrtle Ave. v New York City Bd. of Estimate, 156 A.D.2d 283). In any event petitioner has failed to pay taxes on the property from the date of acquisition, more than ten years prior to the City's foreclosure, and neglected to repair, rehabilitate, or satisfy liens against the property. (See, Solomon v City of New York, Dept. of Gen. Servs., 94 A.D.2d 283.)
Concur — Milonas, J.P., Rosenberger, Asch, Smith and Rubin, JJ.