Another purpose is to instill public confidence in the Bar's integrity. In re Horwitz, 180 Ariz. 20, 29, 881 P.2d 352, 361 (1994) (citing In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 675, 832 P.2d 689, 692 (1992)). ¶ 29 In determining sanctions, we are guided by the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (2005).
In addition, this court "must also try to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity." Id. at 29, 881 P.2d at 361 (citing In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 675, 832 P.2d 689, 692 (1992)). ¶ 65 Peasley's intentional elicitation of false testimony against two defendants in a capital murder trial in 1993, re-presentation of the same false testimony in the 1997 retrial of one of the defendants, and exploitation of that false testimony in the closing argument in both trials, could not have been more harmful to the justice system.
Public confidence in the State Bar is vital. See In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 675, 832 P.2d 689, 692 (1992). ¶ 30 Nonetheless, the Commission's duty to assure public confidence is met with the concomitant responsibility to show fairness to Scholl.
Each concluded, therefore, that respondent engaged in dishonest conduct in connection with a disciplinary matter, in violation of ER 8.1 and ER 8.4. Neither the committee nor the commission offered any explanation for such findings other than that respondent and his witnesses were not believable. Although this court is the final arbiter of law and fact in disciplinary cases, In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 674, 832 P.2d 689, 691 (1992), we normally defer to the findings of the committee, especially in matters of witness credibility, In re Kersting, 151 Ariz. 171, 172, 726 P.2d 587, 588 (1986). We must, however, be satisfied that they are supported by clear and convincing evidence.
This result may appear somewhat harsher than those in other disciplinary cases involving substance abuse. See In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 832 P.2d 689 (1992) (two-year suspension imposed for ethical violations committed during period of alcoholism); In re Nicolini, 168 Ariz. 448, 814 P.2d 1385 (1991) (two-year suspension imposed for violations attributable to alcohol and cocaine abuse when lawyer took steps to rehabilitate); Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 791 P.2d 1037 (lawyer convicted of possessing drugs given two-year suspension when drug use did not affect his work and lawyer had made efforts to rehabilitate himself). We believe, however, that the longer suspension is warranted in light of the seriousness of the charges against respondent, particularly those relating to his representation of Mrs. E. We emphasize that the discipline imposed here would have been even more severe had there not been evidence of respondent's sincere and apparently fruitful efforts at rehabilitation.
We must also try to instill public confidence in the bar's integrity. In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 675, 832 P.2d 689, 692 (1992). Horwitz' many years of alcohol and drug abuse, combined with his criminal conduct, weigh heavily for disbarment.
In fact, other cases support our conclusion that a 2-year suspension in this case is not only appropriate but also proportionate, given respondent's misconduct. See also In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 832 P.2d 689 (1992) (imposing 2-year suspension on attorney who neglected clients and failed to cooperate with State Bar); In re Nicolini, 168 Ariz. 448, 814 P.2d 1385 (1991) (same). Therefore, after considering the aggravating and mitigating factors discussed above, we agree with the Commission's recommendation that a 2-year suspension is a proper sanction for respondent's misconduct.
In re Fresquez, 162 Ariz. 328, 783 P.2d 774 (1989). The Commission agrees with the Committee that disbarment is the only sanction that will fulfill the purpose of lawyer discipline, which is to deter others and protect the public, In re Kersting, 151 Ariz. 171, 726 P.2d 587 (1986), and to give the public confidence in the integrity of the bar, In re Loftus, 171 Ariz. 672, 832 P.2d 689 (1992). The Commission so recommends. The Commission also recommends that Respondent make restitution to the family of Client A in the amount of $350, which represents the fee Client A paid for assistance in matters subsequent to the drafting of the trust, which were not performed.