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Matter of Lewitus v. Tofany

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Nov 2, 1967
28 A.D.2d 1097 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967)

Opinion

November 2, 1967


Judgment, which annulled determination of Commissioner of Motor Vehicles revoking petitioner's driver's license, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs and disbursements, the determination confirmed and petition dismissed, with taxable costs. The determination of the Commissioner cancelled the petitioner's "probationary license" on the basis of his conviction for a speeding violation, committed during the probationary six months' period. Such determination was fully authorized by the provisions of subdivision 1-b of section 501 Veh. Traf. of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Although the memorandum of the Department of Motor Vehicles (N.Y. Legis. Annual, 1965, p. 409) and the memorandum of the Governor (N.Y. Legis. Annual, 1965, p. 503), in connection with the enactment of the particular statute, stressed the fact that it was intended to apply to "new drivers", that is, first time drivers, the plain wording of the enactment makes it applicable to all probationary licensees. Where, as here, the wording of a statute is unambiguous, there is no occasion to resort to legislative or executive memoranda for the purpose of construing the statute. (See Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525; McCluskey v. Cromwell, 11 N.Y. 593, 601; City of Buffalo v. Lawley, 6 A.D.2d 66, 68; Maidman v. Roth, 17 Misc.2d 778, 780.) "If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is neither need nor warrant to look elsewhere for its meaning" ( Matter of Roosevelt Raceway v. Monaghan, 9 N.Y.2d 293, 304, app. dsmd. 368 U.S. 12). We conclude that the statements in the aforesaid memoranda of the Department of Motor Vehicles and the Governor do not furnish justification for disregarding the plain wording of the particular statute to limit the application thereof to "new drivers" who have never before been licensed to operate a vehicle. Finally, we agree with Special Term that there is no merit to the contention of petitioner that section 335-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not properly complied with in connection with his conviction for speeding. It appears that the printed wording of the warning on the summons substantially complied with the provisions of the section in reference to type size.

Concur — Stevens, J.P., Eager, Capozzoli, Tilzer and Rabin, JJ.


Summaries of

Matter of Lewitus v. Tofany

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Nov 2, 1967
28 A.D.2d 1097 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967)
Case details for

Matter of Lewitus v. Tofany

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of WILLIAM LEWITUS, Respondent, v. VINCENT L. TOFANY…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: Nov 2, 1967

Citations

28 A.D.2d 1097 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967)

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