Opinion
March 1, 2001.
Edward J. Nowak, Public Defender of Monroe County (John Elliott of counsel), for defendant.
DECISION
The defendant, who is charged with the crimes of Rape in the First Degree and Sodomy in the Third Degree, made an ex parte application orally for an order directing the complainant and a third party to produce their computers by court process, so that alleged information concerning an unfounded disclosure of rape by the complainant could be extracted to impeach her testimony or as direct evidence against her at the pending trial.
This procedure is not without precedent. See, e.g. People v. Magliore, 178 Misc.2d 849, where defendant ex parte sought a subpoena duces tecum for the personnel records of police officers-complaints.
The defendant did not denominate the court process necessary to effectuate the relief requested, leaving that determination to the court. He did indicate his concern that notice to either the complainant or the third party might result in the destruction of the requested evidence, so he requested that a seizure of the computers be effected without notice to those parties.
In support of his application, the defendant, at the court's request, submitted a copy of a police report indicating that unrelated to the charged sexual offenses, the complaint via e-mail communicated to the third party that a rape had just occurred at her home, that the third party alerted the police via "911" and that the subsequent investigation by the police resulted in a denial by the complainant and her mother of any such incident.
A prior false accusation of rape is admissible to impeach the testimony of the alleged victim of a rape through the medium of cross-examination (People v. Breheny, 270 A.D.2d 926, lv. to app den 95 N.Y.2d 851; People v. Duggan, 229 A.D.2d 688, app den 88 N.Y.2d 984; People v. Sprague, 200 A.D.2d 867, app den 83 N.Y.2d 877), and also witnesses can be produced to testify to those instances to permit an inference that the charged crimes had not been in fact committed (People v. Mandel, 61 A.D.2d 563, rev. on otr grds, 48 N.Y.2d 952, cert den 446 U.S. 949).
The Criminal Procedure Law contains no provisions to address the defendant's request for relief.
In People v. Qike, 182 Misc.2d 737, an answering machine containing a message tape was placed in evidence, but there is no indication that any CPL provisions were used to produce it.
The defendant cannot utilize the demand for discovery pursuant to CPL § 240.20, because the computers are not in the possession and control of the prosecutor (People v. Santorelli, 95 N.Y.2d 412;People v. Tissois, 72 N.Y.2d 75; People v. Yu, 166 A.D.2d 249, app den 76 N.Y.2d 992; People v. Chambers, 134 Misc.2d 688); a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to CPL § 610.20(3) is not available to the defendant, because that section does not authorize the production of the instrument that contains the information requested (see People v. Jovanovic, 176 Misc.2d 729,revd on otr grds 263 A.D.2d 182, lv. to app 94 N.Y.2d 908, app dism 95 N.Y.2d 846, rearg den 95 N.Y.2d 888 People v. Bagley, 183 Misc.2d 523; People v. Weiss, 176 Misc.2d 496); and a search warrant pursuant to CPL § 690.05, which might be the logical process to accomplish the requested relief, can be applied for only by a designated individual, and the defendant is not within that category (see People v. Di Lorenzo, 103 Misc.2d 1098, affd sub nom People v. Cardillo, 80 A.D.2d 952).
The defendant in a sex crimes prosecution subpoenaed from the complainant's university copies of all e-mail communications between the complainant and the defendant and the complainant and third parties using the university's e-mail account and in compliance the university produced the appropriate computer disks; the trial court and appellate court decisions concerned only admissibility.
The defendant's attorney, although an assistant public defender, is not a "public servant" as used in that statute, and at any rate this application was actually made by the defendant through his attorney.
Since the Criminal Procedure Law provides no remedy for the defendant's application, resort must be made to the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPL § 60.10; People v. Davis, 169 Misc.2d 977; People v. Radtke, 153 Misc.2d 554).
The appropriate section is Rule 3120, which insofar as it is applicable to this case, provides as follows:
"As against party: 1. After commencement of an action, any party may serve on any other party notice: (i) to produce and permit the party seeking discovery, . . . to inspect, copy, test or photograph any designated . . . things which are in the possession, custody or control of the party served; . . . (b) As against non-party. A person not a party may be directed by order to do whatever a party may be directed to do under subdivision (a) . . ." (see Hoag v. Chase Pitkin Home and Garden Center, 252 A.D.2d 953 — application of subdivision (b); Ball v. State, 101 Misc.2d 554 — computer printout of auto accidents at certain intersection prepared by Department of Transportation).
While the notice referred to in Rule 3120(b) could be accomplished by a notice of motion in accordance with Rule 2214(a), since the defendant alleges that there is the possibility of destruction of the material contained in the two computers, the defendant should proceed via an order to show cause in accordance with subdivision (d) of that Rule. "One of the best reasons for seeking to bring a motion on by order to show cause is a demonstrated need for a retention of a status quo until a contested hearing . . . [I]f such a showing is made . . ., the order to show cause can contain an additional clause restraining the other side from specified doings until further order of the court" (Siegel, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR § 2214:26, p. 103; see Northside Studios v. Treccagnoli, 262 A.D.2d 469).
CPLR § 3120(b), insofar as it is applicable to the required notice, provides as follows: "The motion for such order shall be on notice to all adverse parties; the nonparty shall be served with the notice of motion in the same manner as a summons." The district attorney is obviously an "adverse" party, so the appropriate prosecutor should be served with the order to show cause (see People v. Qike, 182 Misc.2d 737; People v. Magliore 178 Misc.2d 489). This section mandates that the complainant and the third art also must be served with the order to show cause (People v. Davis, supra ; see People v. Magliore, supra; People v. Radtke, supra).
This case held that the district attorney under the doctrine of jus tertii on behalf of the complainant could move to suppress an audio tape acquired by the defendant as a result of illegal eavesdropping.
This case cited CPLR 3120(b) but posited that the district attorney lacked standing to intervene on behalf of third parties.
Accordingly, the application of the defendant is granted to the extent that he may submit an order to show cause to the court which complies with all the provisions of CPLR § 3120 and CPLR § 2214 .
Because of the defendant's claim of possible destruction of alleged evidence, this decision will not be filed until service of the order to show cause has been effected upon all the parties to this proceeding.