Opinion
February 3, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Erie County, Ostrowski, J.
Present — Denman, J.P., Boomer, Pine and Davis, JJ.
Judgment unanimously reversed on the law with costs and petition dismissed. Memorandum: Special Term erred in concluding that this proceeding merely sought the enforcement of a contract and that the New York Statute of Limitations (CPLR 213) applied. A special proceeding to compel arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement is governed by Federal law (Matter of Long Is. Lbr. Co. [Martin], 15 N.Y.2d 380, 382-383; see also, Milk Drivers Dairy Employees Union Local No. 338 v Dairymen's League Co-op. Assn., 304 F.2d 913). Under Federal law, the six-month Statute of Limitations set forth in section 10 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 160 [b]) is applicable to such proceedings (Associated Brick Mason Contrs. v Harrington, 820 F.2d 31 [2d Cir]; International Assn. of Machinists Aerospace Workers v Allied Prods. Corp., 786 F.2d 1561; Nichter Assocs. v Laborers' Intl. Union, 666 F. Supp. 38, affd 841 F.2d 1117). The statutory period begins to run when the employer refuses arbitration (Niro v Fearn Intl., 827 F.2d 173; Associated Brick Mason Contrs. v Harrington, supra; McCreedy v Local Union No. 971, 809 F.2d 1232, reh denied 818 F.2d 6). In the subject case, petitioner acknowledged that the employer, Shevlin-Manning, refused to participate in arbitration on August 19, 1985. This proceeding, commenced on June 4, 1986, was untimely, and the petition should have been dismissed as time barred. In light of this determination, we reach no other issues raised by the parties.